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Abstract
This paper examines the empirical signiﬁcance of learning, a type of adaptive,
boundedly rational expectations, in the U.S. economy within the framework of the
New Keynesian model. Two popular speciﬁcations of the model are estimated: the
standard three equation model that does not include capital, and an extended model
that allows for endogenous capital accumulation. Estimation results for learning mod-
els can be sensitive to the choice for the initial conditions for agents expectations, so
four diﬀerent methods for choosing initial conditions are examined, including jointly
estimating the initial conditions with the other parameters of the model. Maximum
likelihood results show that learning under all methods for initial conditions lead to
very similar predictions as rational expectations, and do not signiﬁcantly improve the
ﬁt the model. The evolution of forecast errors show that the learning models do not
out perform the rational expectations model during the run-up of inﬂation in the 1970s
and the subsequent decline in the 1980s, a period of U.S. history which others have
suggested learning may play a role. Despite the failure of learning models to better
explain the data, analysis of the paths of expectations and structural shocks during the
sample show that allowing for learning in the models can lead to diﬀerent explanations
for the data.
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1 Introduction
Rational expectations is one of the most common assumptions in dynamic macroeconomic
models. While it is usually made for mathematical convenience, the assumption regarding
expectations formation can have non-trivial eﬀects on a model's dynamics. In particular, a
large amount of literature has addressed the implications of least squares learning for popular
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Agents in a DSGE model that learn
do not know the parameters of the model, and instead form expectations by collecting past
data and compute least squares forecasts. In this paper I investigate the statistical evidence
of learning within the framework of a New Keynesian monetary model and examine the
implications of incorporating learning on the predictions of the model
Recent papers have found that least squares learning can important eﬀects on output and
inﬂation determination. Orphanides and Williams (2005b) use an estimated two equation
monetary model and demonstrate with simulations of impulse response functions that least
squares learning can lead to prolonged inﬂation following an inﬂation shock. Using the same
model, Orphanides and Williams (2005a) ﬁnd in another paper that learning on the part
of monetary policy can possibly explain the period of stagﬂation during the 1970s. They
suggest that the monetary authority was under-estimating the natural rate of unemployment
during this time, and was therefore responding too aggressively to unemployment and not
enough to inﬂation. They suggest that had the central bank responded to inﬂation instead
of unemployment, lower inﬂation and unemployment would have resulted. Primiceri (2006)
suggests that learning on the part of the central bank can explain both the run-up of inﬂa-
tion during the 1970s and the subsequent decline during the 1980s. He suggests that the
monetary authority was under-estimating both the natural rate of unemployment and the
degree of inﬂation persistence. Like Orphanides and Williams (2005a), he shows the resulting
monetary policy leads to an increase in inﬂation, but as time progresses the central bank's
expectations evolve. The central bank's expectations of the natural rate of unemployment
and the degree of inﬂation persistence return their actual values and therefore the policy
prescription becomes stabilizing, resulting in the moderation that occurred from the middle
1980s onward.
The results from these papers depend on a calibrated value for the constant learning gain,
a parameter that is responsible for the speed in which expectations evolve, and therefore
responsible for the impact learning can have on the dynamics of the model. Milani (2005)
is the ﬁrst paper to estimate the learning gain jointly with the parameters of a model. He
ﬁnds an estimate for the learning gain which is very close to calibrated values that are
popular in the literature. He estimates a standard three equation New Keynesian model and
ﬁnds evidence in U.S. data that learning explains persistence in output and inﬂation better
than habit formation and inﬂation indexation. Like the papers cited above, Milani makes
speciﬁc assumptions about the initial conditions of agents expectations. Many of the initial
conditions are set equal to pre-sample ordinary least squares estimates. The exceptions are
the degree of inﬂation persistence, which he assumes is equal to zero, and the sensitivity of
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output to inﬂation, which he assumes is higher than the pre-sample evidence.
The results of all of these studies depend on the assumptions for the initial conditions for
agents and/or central bank's expectations. These initial conditions are sometimes backed
by an economic justiﬁcation or an argument that such a set of initial conditions accounts
well for the data. In this paper, instead of suggesting a speciﬁc assumption for the initial
expectations of agents, I examine a number of alternative methods for forming these initial
conditions. These methods include using the rational expectations solution of the model,
using estimates from pre-sample data, and estimating all the initial conditions jointly with
the other parameters of the model.
To determine if the estimation results are sensitive to the setup of the New Keynesian
model I examine two popular speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the popular three equa-
tion model with the output, inﬂation, and interest rate determined by utility maximization
with the possibility of habit formation, proﬁt maximization under Calvo (1983) sticky prices
and inﬂation indexation, and monetary policy following a Taylor (1993) rule. In this speciﬁ-
cation there is no capital accumulation and output is produced only with labor. The second
speciﬁcation, suggested by Woodford (2005), extends the model to allow for endogenous
capital accumulation, where ﬁrms make decisions on investment of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.
There are a number of motivations for extending the empirical analysis to the model with
capital accumulation. Including capital in the model introduces data on another variable,
aggregate investment, to be included in the estimation procedure. Secondly, introducing
capital may alter how expectations are formed, since agents may use past data on capital to
make there forecasts. Finally, incorporating capital introduces more expectations into the
model which may allow learning may play a bigger role.
The maximum likelihood results indicate that incorporating learning into the New Key-
nesian models provides little to no improvement in the ﬁt to the data. There is some evidence
that the ﬁt improves when using learning frameworks that do not endow agents with data
on structural shocks. I ﬁnd that setting the initial conditions of agents' expectations equal
to least squares estimates from pre-sample data actually results in a worse performance of
the model. When estimating the initial conditions jointly with the parameters of the model,
I ﬁnd some key parameters governing the persistence and volatility of the model cannot be
jointly identiﬁed with the initial conditions, suggesting that imposing ad-hock initial con-
ditions can inﬂuence the point estimates of these parameters. Finally, plots of the forecast
errors, the estimated evolution of structural shocks, and the evolution of agents expectations,
are examined to determine if any of the learning models can better explain speciﬁc periods
of U.S. data, such as the run-up of inﬂation in the 1970s and subsequent decline. The results
indicate that the learning models do not perform any better than rational expectations. De-
spite the failure learning models to better explain the data, diﬀerences do arise in some of
the parameter estimates and in the predictions of the structural shocks in the model with
capital.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the New Keynesian
model with and without capital. Section 3 describes the learning process and how learning
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is incorporated into the model. Section 4 describes the maximum likelihood procedure and
the four cases for how initial conditions are constructed. Section 5 reports the results, and
section 6 concluded.
2 Model
The New Keynesian model has been used extensively in monetary economics for analysis
of theoretical and empirical issues and it is a convenient framework to examine the role of
learning on output and inﬂation determination. Woodford (2003) provides a complete expo-
sition of the model's micro-foundations, its many extensions, and implications for monetary
policy, and Appendix A of this paper provides the complete details of the derivation of the
model. This paper considers the implications of learning under two popular speciﬁcations of
the model. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is a framework in which the role of capital is ignored, so
that output is produced only from labor. This is a popular speciﬁcation for empirical work
because it allows the model to be written solely in terms of the stationary observable vari-
ables: the inﬂation rate, the interest rate, and the output gap. The output gap is deﬁned as
the percentage deviation of real GDP from the value that would occur under full employment
and completely ﬂexible prices. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) provides a measure
of the output gap for the United States, which is used when estimating this speciﬁcation of
the model.
The second speciﬁcation explicitly accounts for endogenous capital accumulation. Output
is produced under constant returns using both labor and ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Not only is
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital a more realistic assumption than a perfect rental market for capital,
but Woodford (2005) shows that allowing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital alters the coeﬃcient on
marginal cost in the Phillips curve in such a way that allows for greater price ﬂexibility to
be consistent with very small values of the coeﬃcient, which is often seen in empirical work,
including this paper. The drawback of using this speciﬁcation is that the model cannot be
written in terms of the output gap. The model in this case is written in terms of observable,
non-stationary variables: real GDP and real gross private domestic investment. In Section
4 I describe how I account for the issue of non-stationarity.
Both speciﬁcations have a continuum of consumers types on the unit interval, and a
continuum of intermediate goods producers on the unit interval, each producing a unique
intermediate good. Each consumer type possesses a speciﬁc labor skill that can only be
hired by a corresponding intermediate goods producer. It is assumed that there are many
consumers in each consumer type so that consumers do not have market power over the wage.
Production of intermediate goods may also depend on capital goods which are ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
Since a capital good in ﬁrm i cannot be used by another ﬁrm j, there is not a perfect capital
rental market which would equalize the marginal product of capital across intermediate good
ﬁrms. Therefore each ﬁrm's labor demand and pricing decision will depend on its current
capital stock, which in turn depends on the ﬁrm's entire past history.
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All the intermediate goods are used to produce a single type of ﬁnal good, but they are
imperfect substitutes for each other in production; therefore intermediate goods producing
ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive. Prices of intermediate goods are imperfectly ﬂexible
according to Calvo's (1983) pricing mechanism where a constant fraction of ﬁrms is able to
re-optimize its price every period, and the ﬁrms selected to do so is randomly determined,
independently of ﬁrms' histories or characteristics. This setup for sticky prices may seem
unrealistic, but Roberts (1995) shows in a model without ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital that quadratic
price adjustment cost, an alternative pricing friction suggested by Rotemberg (1982), yields
the same solution as Calvo pricing. The same is not true with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Under
Calvo pricing, at any point in time, each ﬁrm will have a diﬀerent pricing history and there-
fore a diﬀerent capital stock. Each ﬁrm's relative capital stock will in turn aﬀect the pricing
decision. Under quadratic price adjustment costs, all ﬁrms face the same friction every pe-
riod, and so all ﬁrms price, labor, and investment decisions remain identical throughout time.
Therefore, even though Calvo pricing may seem to be an unrealistic setting, it is a convenient
framework to analyze the consequences of the realistic assumption of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
2.1 Consumers
Each consumer type has a speciﬁc labor skill that can only be hired by a speciﬁc intermediate
goods producing ﬁrm. Since each intermediate goods ﬁrm has a diﬀerent labor demand,
wage income will be diﬀerent for each consumer type. Given a perfect asset market, though,
consumption will be equal across all consumers. Each consumer type i ∈ (0, 1) maximizes
utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
1
1− σξt (ct − ηct−1)
1−σ − 1
1 + µ
nt(i)
1+µ
]
,
subject to the budget constraint,
ct + bt(i) =
1 + rt−1
1 + pit
bt−1(i) +
wt(i)
pt
nt(i) + Πt − τt
where ct, consumption at time t, is not indexed by individual type i since it is equal across all
agents, ξt is an aggregate preference shock, nt(i) and wt(i)/pt are the labor supply and real
wage of individual i at time t, respectively, bt(i) is individual i's purchase of real government
bonds at time t, rt is the nominal interest rate paid on government bonds, pit is the inﬂation
rate, Πt is the value of proﬁts earned by owning stock in ﬁrms, and τt is the value of real
lump sum taxes. The preference parameters are σ ∈ (0,∞), which is the inverse of a pseudo
intertemporal elasticity of substitution,1 η ∈ [0, 1), which is the degree of habit formation,
and µ ∈ (0,∞) which is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply. Appendix A shows that
1When there is no habit formation, σ is exactly equal to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
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the ﬁrst order conditions for the consumer lead to the log-linear Euler equation,
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1, (1)
where a hat indicates the percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state.2 Here,
λˆt is the marginal utility of real income, given by,
λˆt =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEtcˆt+1 − σ(1 + βη2)cˆt + σηcˆt−1
]
+
(
ξˆt − βηEtξˆt+1
)
. (2)
I assume that the preference shock, ξˆt, follows the exogenous autoregressive process,
ξˆt = ρξ ξˆt−1 + ξ,t, (3)
where ξ,t is independently and identically with mean zero and variance given by σ
2
ξ .
When there is no habit formation, equations (1) and (2) lead to the standard IS equation,
cˆt = Etcˆt+1 − 1
σ
(rˆt − Etpit+1) + ξˆt.
Habit formation is added to the model, because as equation (2) demonstrates, habit for-
mation introduces a source of persistence that does not depend on learning. The larger is
the degree of habit formation, the more current period marginal utility depends on past
consumption. Since consumption is related to output in the market clearing condition, habit
formation creates output persistence. Moreover, Fuhrer (2000) ﬁnds that habit formation
leads to hump shaped impulse response functions, a phenomenon evident in the data.
Appendix A shows that when there is no investment in the model, the demand side of
the model can be rewritten in terms of the output gap as follows:
λ˜t =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEty˜t+1 − σ(1 + βη2)y˜t + σηy˜t−1
]
(4)
λ˜t = Etλ˜t+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1 − rnt (5)
where y˜t denotes the output gap, which is percentage deviation of output from the outcome
that would occur under fully ﬂexible prices, and rnt is the natural interest rate, the real
interest that would occur under fully ﬂexible prices. I suppose the natural interest rate
follows the exogenous process,
rnt = (1− ρ) rn + ρrnt−1 + n,t, (6)
where rn is the steady state real interest rate, and n,t is independently and identically
2A hat is omitted from inﬂation because, as Appendix A demonstrates, in order to derive the Phillips
curve it is necessary to assume the steady state inﬂation rate is equal to zero.
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distributed with mean zero and variance given by σ2n.
2.2 Producers
There is one ﬁnal good used for consumption and investment which is sold in a perfectly
competitive market and produced with a continuum of intermediate goods. The production
function is given by,
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
(7)
where yt is the output of the ﬁnal good, yt(i) is intermediate good i, and θ ∈ (1,∞) is the
elasticity of substitution in production. Proﬁt maximization leads to the demand for each
intermediate good,
yt(i) =
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θ
yt, (8)
where pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i and pt is the price of the ﬁnal good. Substi-
tuting equation (8) into (7) leads to a consumption price index that holds in equilibrium,
pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (9)
2.2.1 Intermediate goods
The framework for intermediate goods depends on whether the model speciﬁcation includes
capital. In the simple speciﬁcation that does not include capital, each intermediate good is
produced with a unique type of labor according to the linear production function,
yt(i) = ztnt(i), (10)
where zt is a stochastic technology shock common to all intermediate goods ﬁrms. Output
for intermediate good i is demand determined according to the ﬁrm's pricing decisions and
the demand equation given in (8). For this given level of output, intermediate goods ﬁrms
choose labor demand to minimize real total cost,
Ct(i) =
wt(i)
pt
nt(i). (11)
Appendix A shows when ﬁrms hire optimal amounts of labor, the average marginal cost
among all the intermediate goods ﬁrms (in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady
state) is given by,
sˆt = µyˆt − λˆt − (µ+ 1)zˆt (12)
In the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, the intermediate good is produced with the
same labor input and a unique type of capital good according to the constant returns to
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scale production function,
yt(i) = ztkt(i)
αnt(i)
1−α (13)
where kt(i) is capital hired by ﬁrm i. For a given level of output, intermediate goods ﬁrms
choose labor demand and rent capital to minimize real total cost,
Ct =
wt(i)
pt
nt(i) + ρt(i)kt(i), (14)
where ρt(i) is the rental price of capital good i. Appendix A shows when ﬁrms hire optimal
amounts of labor and capital, the average marginal cost among all the intermediate goods
ﬁrms (in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady state) is given by,
sˆt =
µ+ α
1− α yˆt −
α(µ+ 1)
1− α kˆt − λˆt −
µ+ 1
1− αzˆt, (15)
where kˆt is the percentage deviation of the aggregate capital stock from its steady state. The
technology shock is assumed to follow the exogenous stochastic process,
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + z,t, (16)
where z,t is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance given by
σ2z .
2.2.2 Firm-speciﬁc capital goods
Capital goods ﬁrms maintain ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stocks and rent the capital to the corre-
sponding intermediate goods ﬁrm at a real price of ρt(i) per unit of capital. This assumption
in not essential and is purely used for notational convenience. This model supposes that
the market for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is purely competitive, even though ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
cannot be sold to other ﬁrms. This assumption assures an optimal amount of investment in
each ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital good which would be the same outcome if the intermediate goods
ﬁrms were to invest and own the capital themselves instead of renting it.
Capital goods ﬁrms purchase the ﬁnal good and convert it to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital good.
The conversion from a ﬁnal good to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital good is irreversible and is subject
to a stochastic shock, µt, that is common to all capital goods. Let It(i) denote the purchase
of the ﬁnal good for investment for capital good i, so that µtIt(i) be the amount a purchase
of It(i) adds to the capital stock. The evolution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital i is given as,
kt+1(i) = (1− δ)kt(i) + µtIt(i)− φ
2
[
kt+1(i)
kt(i)
− 1
]2
kt(i) (17)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital depreciation rate and φ ∈ (0,∞) is a capital adjustment
cost parameter. When φ = 0, there is no adjustment cost and capital net of depreciation
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increases by µtIt(i). Log-linearizing equation (17) then integrating across all the ﬁrms leads
to the following relationship between capital and investment:
kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + δIˆt + δµˆt (18)
Capital goods ﬁrms choose investment to maximize the expected utility value of proﬁts,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλt [ρt(i)kt(i)− It(i)] , (19)
subject to equation (17). The appendix shows that proﬁt maximization leads to the following
evolution of the aggregate capital stock:
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1 − kˆt
)
= β(1− δ)Etλˆt+1
+
(
1− β (1− δ)
1− α
) [
(µ+ 1)Etyˆt+1 − (1 + αµ)kˆt+1
]
+βφ
(
Etkˆt+2 − kˆt+1
)
− (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
1− α Etzˆt+1 + µˆt − β(1− δ)Etµˆt+1.
(20)
The investment shock is assumed to follow the stochastic process,
µˆt = ρµµˆt−1 + µ,t (21)
where µ,t is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance given by
σ2µ.
2.2.3 Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve is a single equation that describes the relationship between inﬂation and
output, as determined by the supply side of the economy when prices are sticky. The speciﬁc
price friction employed in this paper is Calvo (1983) pricing. According to this method, only
a random subset of intermediate goods ﬁrms are able to re-optimize their price in a given
period. Allowing for inﬂation indexation, those ﬁrms who are not able to re-optimize their
price may adjust their price by a fraction, γ, of the previous period's inﬂation rate. Let
ω ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of ﬁrms who are not able to change their prices each period.
Since the speciﬁc ﬁrms able to change their prices each period is randomly determined, ωT
is the probability a ﬁrm will not be able to change its price for T consecutive periods. A
ﬁrm who is able to change its price maximizes the following present discounted utility value
of proﬁts earned while the ﬁrm is unable to change its price again:
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt
{(
pt+T (i)
pt+T
)
yt+T (i)− S [yt+T (i)]
}
, (22)
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where S [yt+T (i)] is the real total cost function of producing yt+T (i) units, given optimal
decisions for labor and capital, and pt+T (i) is the ﬁrm's price in period t+ T , given the ﬁrm
has not yet been able to re-optimize its price. When there is a positive degree of inﬂation
indexation, this price is determined by,
log pt+T (i) = log pt+T−1(i) + γpit+T−1 (23)
Appendix A shows that the ﬁrms' optimal choices for prices in combination with equi-
librium in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital goods market leads to the following Phillips curve,
pit =
(
1
1 + βγ
)
(γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κsˆt) (24)
where κ decreases as ω, the degree of price stickiness, increases. The parameter κ is also a
function of other parameters of the model, but in the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital,
there is not a closed form expression for κ. Appendix A describes the full details of the
derivation of the Phillips curve.
When there is no capital accumulation in the model, Appendix A shows the Phillips
curve can be rewritten in terms of the output gap as,
pit =
(
1
1− βγ
) [
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κ
(
µy˜t − λ˜t
)]
. (25)
When estimating this speciﬁcation of the model using likelihood methods, it is convenient
for the Phillips curve to include an exogenous stochastic shock. While the microfoundations
do not support a shock on the Phillips curve when expressed in terms of the output gap, I
amend equation (25) with a cost push shock, so the Phillips curve that is estimated has
the following form,
pit =
(
1
1− βγ
) [
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κ
(
µy˜t − λ˜t
)
+ ut
]
, (26)
where ut is an exogenous cost push shock that evolves according to,
ut = ρuut−1 + u,t (27)
where u,t is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance given by
σ2u.
2.2.4 Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate is determined jointly with output and inﬂation by monetary policy.
In this paper I assume the monetary authority follows a Taylor (1993) type rule where the
interest rate is set in response to output and inﬂation, with a preference for interest rate
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smoothing. In the speciﬁcation of the model without capital accumulation, the monetary
authority is assumed to respond to the output gap, therefore the Taylor rule is given by,
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr) (ψpipit + ψyy˜t) + r,t (28)
where ρr ∈ [0, 1) is a degree of interest rate smoothing desired by the monetary authority,
ψpi ∈ (0,∞) is the feedback on the interest rate to inﬂation, ψy ∈ (0,∞) is the feedback
on the interest rate to output gap, and r,t is an independently and identically distributed
exogenous monetary policy shock with mean zero and variance given by σ2r .
In the model speciﬁcation with endogenous capital accumulation, the monetary authority
is instead assumed to respond to the deviation of output from the steady state (instead of
the deviation from the ﬂexible price outcome). In this case the Taylor rule is given by,
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr) (ψpipit + ψyyˆt) + r,t. (29)
2.3 Complete Model
The complete system for the speciﬁcation without capital accumulation has four variables:
the output gap (y˜t), the marginal utility of income gap (λ˜t), the inﬂation rate (pit), and
the interest rate (rt). The marginal utility is deﬁned by equation (4), and the output gap,
inﬂation rate, and interest rate, are jointly determined by the Euler equation (5), the Phillips
curve (26), and the Taylor rule (28). The stochastic shocks in the system are the natural
interest rate shock, whose evolution is given in equation (6), the cost push shock whose given
in equation (27), and the monetary policy shock.
The model speciﬁcation that includes endogenous capital accumulation has eight vari-
ables: consumption (cˆt), marginal utility of income (λˆt), investment (Iˆt), capital stock (kˆt),
marginal cost (sˆt), output (yˆt), inﬂation (pit), and the interest rate (rˆt). The demand side
of the model consists of the Euler equation, (1), and the deﬁnition of the marginal utility
of income, (2). The supply side of the model consists of the Phillips curve, (24), the deﬁni-
tion of the marginal cost, (15), the evolution of capital, (20), and the relationship between
investment and capital, (18). The model is completed with the monetary policy rule, (29),
and the following log-linear goods market clearing condition,
yˆt = cy cˆt + δky Iˆt, (30)
where cy is the steady state consumption to output ratio and ky is the steady state capital
to output ratio. Appendix A shows that ky and cy are given by,
ky =
βα(θ − 1)
θ (1− β + βδ) ,
cy = 1− δky.
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There are four exogenous shocks in the model: the preference shock, ξt, whose evolution
is given in equation (3); the technology shock, zt, whose evolution is given in equation (16);
the investment shock, µt, whose evolution is given in equation (21); and the monetary policy
shock, r,t.
3 Learning
3.1 Learning process
The speciﬁc type of adaptive learning process considered in this paper is least squares learn-
ing. Under least squares learning, agents form expectations by collecting past data and
computing least squares estimates. The speciﬁc type of least squares learning I use is con-
stant gain learning, which is consistent with agents' forecasts based on weighted least squares,
where more recent observations are given more weight, and the weights decline geometrically
with the age of the observations. This is a popular assumption in the learning literature and
is the same type of learning used by Orphanides and Williams (2005b) to explain inﬂation
scares, Primiceri (2006) to explain the inﬂation volatility in the 1970s, and Milani (2005) to
explain output and inﬂation persistence.
Constant gain least squares learning is arguably similar to how expectations are actually
formed in the U.S economy. Under some of the speciﬁcations of least squares learning
examined in this paper, agents in the model use exactly the same data that is available to
an econometrician, such as the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate.
Least squares forecasts also often out-perform more complex economic models in out of
sample forecasts, and the welfare of individuals who make output, consumption, and savings
decisions depend on the accuracy of forecasts, and not the ability to identify parameters
of an econometric model, or the ability to make counter-factual predictions. These latter
qualities, found in structural economic models, are desirable mostly by policy makers. The
constant gain assumption can also be argued as realistic as it captures the idea that agents
agents believe changes in the economy are possible, so that agents view more recent data
as more likely to yield accurate forecasts than data from further in the past. I demonstrate
in the next section that constant gain least squares is equivalent to a very speciﬁc type of
weighted least squares which is not an actual popular estimation method. However, Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) suggest that constant gain least squares is a good approximation
for agents that use a rolling window of data. That is agents do not use all the data as
far back as possible, but form forecasts based on the most recent data for a given number
of observations. This is very close to common practice, as empirical studies that forecast
output and inﬂation typically use at most 50 years of data, despite annual data available
from Johnston and Williamson (2007) for both these variables dating all they way back to
the year 1790.
There is also a theoretical and empirical appeal to using constant gain learning. The
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theoretical appeal is that unlike with ordinary least squares, with weighted least squares the
eﬀects of learning persist in the long run. With ordinary least squares, as time progresses
agents obtain more and more observations and so their sample sizes approach inﬁnity. There-
fore, the eﬀect a single new observation has on the agents' estimation results disappears.
Constant gain learning instead assumes that a new observation carries the same weight ev-
ery period, regardless of how much time has progressed. The empirical appeal is that the
degree to which learning aﬀects the dynamics of the economy can be determined by esti-
mating a single parameter, the learning gain. Moreover, with appropriate initial conditions
for the learning process, constant gain learning nests the rational expectations framework,
where rational expectations is the special case where the learning gain is equal to zero.
Standard statistical tests that determine if a parameter is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
can determine the statistical signiﬁcance of learning, and formally reject or fail to reject the
assumption of rational expectations.
The log-linearized New Keynesian model in the previous section has the following general
form:
Ω0xt = Ω1xt−1 + Ω2E∗t xt+1 +Ψvt, (31)
vt = Avt−1 + t (32)
where xt is a vector of minimum state variables (expressed as percentage deviations from
their steady state), E∗t refers to a possibly non-rational expectations operator, vt is a vector of
structural shocks, and t is a vector of independently and identically distributed innovations
to the shock process. The minimum state variable solution of the model can be written as,
xt = Gxt−1 +Hvt. (33)
To agents that learn with a correctly speciﬁed model, the actual values in the matrices G
and H are unknown, but agents use the form of equation (33) to estimate future values of xt
by least squares. It is assumed that when agents begin period t, time t observations are not
yet realized; therefore agents collect observations up through time period t − 1. From this
agents make least squares forecast, then make consumption, production, investment, and
pricing decisions based on these expectations. Only after these decisions are implemented,
that is at the end of time period t, do time t observations become available. This is both a
realistic assumption, if using quarterly macroeconomic data, and a mathematically simpli-
fying assumption. The latest numbers from statistical agencies such as the Bureau of Labor
Statistics are almost always at least one quarter old. It is of great mathematical convenience,
because the term E∗t xt+1 in equation (31) is then only a function of observations through
period t− 1. Therefore, solving for xt in terms of past state variables is straightforward. If
instead E∗t xt+1 was a function of xt, non-linear numerical methods would be needed to solve
the model as least squares forecasts are non-linear.
To forecast xt+1, agents estimate G and H by least squares using as regressors variables
in the vector xt−1, and the shocks included in vt. Assuming agents have data available on
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shocks is not very realistic, but this assumption can be dropped. In Section 4 I estimate the
models under both cases, so that when comparing the results from the learning and rational
expectations models, it will be clear what results derive from the learning process, and what
results derive from assuming that agents have a more limited information set.
Agents do not use all the variables in xt as regressors, only those that correspond to
non-zero columns in G. If an entire column in G is equal to zero, this implies that the past
observation in the associated element in xt−1 does not inﬂuence xt in the MSV solution. I
assume agents know the structural form of the economy and therefore use as explanatory
variables only the variables that have non-zero coeﬃcients in G. In the New Keynesian model
in the previous section with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, the variables with non-zero coeﬃcients in
G include consumption, capital, the inﬂation rate, and the interest rate. The variables in
the model that are not used as explanatory variables are output, marginal cost, marginal
utility of income, and investment. These variables do not directly lead to any persistence
in the model and are simply non-stochastic linear functions of the other variables that have
non-zero coeﬃcients in G, and so are perfectly co-linear with the variables that agents do
include in the regression. In the speciﬁcation without endogenous capital, the variables used
for explanatory variables are the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the interest rate.
I assume agents also use a constant term in their least squares forecasts. The structural
form of the model, (31), does not include a constant, but since this equation is written
in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state, including a constant in agents'
estimation equations implies agents do not know the steady state values of the economy.
Let Φt denote the time t estimate of the all the coeﬃcients to be estimated in the learning
process. These coeﬃcients include a vector of constants, the non-zero columns in G, and all
the columns in H in the case where shocks are used as explanatory variables. Let Yt denote
the time t dependent variables used in the learning process. Since time t data is not available
to agents, Yt = xt−1. Let Xt denote the vector of time t explanatory variables. If agents
include the stochastic shocks in their explanatory variables, X ′t = [1 x
′
t−2v
′
t−1], otherwise
X ′t = [1 x
′
t−2]. If agents estimate equation (33) by ordinary least squares, they form the
estimate,
Φ′t =
(
1
t− 1
t∑
τ=2
XτX
′
τ
)−1 (
1
t− 1
t∑
τ=2
XτY
′
τ
)
. (34)
The ordinary least squares estimate Φt can be rewritten into the convenient recursive
form:
Φt = Φt−1 + gt(Yt − Φt−1Xt)X ′tR−1t , (35)
Rt = Rt−1 + gt(XtX ′t −Rt−1), (36)
where gt = 1/(t − 1) is the learning gain.3 The recursive form demonstrates precisely how
expectations are adaptive. Agents take the previous period's estimates, Φt−1 and Rt−1, and
correct them according to the residual between the previous period's forecast and the new
3To show this, let Rt = 1t−1
∑t
τ=2XτX
′
τ and Φ
′ = R−1t
(
1
t−1
∑t
τ=2XτY
′
τ
)
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observation. The amount of the correction depends on the learning gain. With ordinary
least squares and inﬁnite memory, the learning gain approaches zero as time approaches
inﬁnity, so the eﬀect new observations have on updating the beliefs of Φ and R diminish
as the number of observations already in the sample approaches inﬁnity. Constant gain
learning instead assumes that the learning gain gt remains constant over time. This allows
new observations to inﬂuence estimation results by the same weight throughout time. If the
constant gain is equal to zero, the estimate Φt remains at its initial value throughout time.
Given an initial value equal to the rational expectations solution, a zero constant learning
gain implies rational expectations.
Let gˆ0,t denote the estimated constant term in Φt, and let Gˆt and Hˆt denote the time t
estimate of G and H, respectively, obtained from Φt. Agents' expectation of xt+1 is given
by,
E∗t xt+1 = gˆ0,t + GˆtE
∗
t xt + HˆEtvt+1 (37)
Note that equation (37) assumes that expectations about future shocks, vt+1, are rational.
This is a common simplifying assumption made in learning models. It is possible to allow
agents to also estimate the coeﬃcients in the shock process, but the dynamics deriving from
this additional complication are negligible. Since time t observations are not yet available to
agents, agents must also estimate xt by least squares. The time t estimate of xt is given by,
Etx
∗
t = gˆ0,t + Gˆtxt−1 + Hˆvt. (38)
Plugging this into equation (37) yields,
E∗t xt+1 = (I + Gˆt)gˆ0,t + Gˆ
2
txt−1 +
(
GˆtHˆt + HˆtA
)
vt. (39)
Plugging the agents' forecast, (39), into the structural form of the model, (31), leads to
the following actual law of motion for xt:
xt = Ω
−1
0 Ω2
(
I + Gˆt
)
gˆ0,t + Ω
−1
0
(
Ω1 + Ω2Gˆ
2
t
)
xt−1 + Ω−10
[
Ψ+ Ω2
(
GˆtHˆt + HˆtA
)]
vt. (40)
4 Estimation
4.1 Data
In this section I estimate two speciﬁcations of the New Keynesian model. The ﬁrst is the
speciﬁcation that does not include capital, and the second is the speciﬁcation does account
for endogenous capital accumulation. In the speciﬁcation without capital, the model is
written in terms of the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the interest rate. The output
gap is measured by the percentage deviation of real GDP from the Congressional Budget
Oﬃce measure of potential GDP. The inﬂation rate measured by the annualized percentage
change in GDP deﬂater, and the interest rate measured by the annualized federal funds rate.
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For the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, the data includes four variables: real consumption
expenditures, real gross private domestic investment, and the same measures of inﬂation and
the interest rate. Output in this model is deﬁned as the sum of consumption and investment.
The model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment is written in terms of percentage deviations
of consumption and investment from their respective steady states. Since consumption and
investment are non-stationary series, assuming there are steady state values of these variables
is not valid. Consumption and investment are instead de-trended by removing a trend growth
rate. To illustrate with consumption, let gc be the average growth rate of consumption, let
ct denote de-trended consumption, and let Ct denote the original consumption series. De-
trended consumption is determined according to,
ct =
Ct
(1 + gc)
t .
Investment is likewise de-trended. Quarterly data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis FRED database is used for the ﬁrst quarter of 1960 through the last quarter of 2006.
To determine initial conditions for the learning process, pre-sample quarterly data is used
on these same variables from the ﬁrst quarter of 1954 through the last quarter of 1959.
4.2 Initial conditions
For both speciﬁcations of the New Keynesian model I estimate the model under ﬁve diﬀerent
cases for how expectations are formed. Case 1 is rational expectations, and the remaining
cases are learning with diﬀerent assumptions for initial conditions and what variables agents
use as explanatory variables in their least squares estimates. Case 2 can be viewed as the
closest to rational expectations. Agents learn according to constant gain least squares, but
the initial values for the learning matrices Φ and R are equal to the rational expectations
solution. Furthermore, in case 2 agents include the structural shocks as explanatory variables.
Since agents have the same information set as in case 1, and the initial conditions under both
cases are the same, when the constant learning gain is equal to zero, case 2 is equivalent to
case 1.
Case 3 makes another incremental step away from rational expectations. Agents again
learn according to constant gain least squares, and their initial conditions for the learning
matrices are equal to the rational expectations values, but agents are not able to collect data
on past shocks in order to use them as explanatory variables.
The ﬁnal two cases assume the agents have the same information set as case 3, but
the initial conditions for the learning process are diﬀerent from the rational expectations
solution. In case 4 the initial conditions are equal to constant gain least squares estimates
from pre-sample data. This is similar to how Milani (2005) initializes the learning matrices,
but he uses estimates from a ﬁrst order vector autoregression estimated from ordinary least
squares, which is consistent instead with a decreasing learning gain. In this paper, the initial
conditions for the learning process are consistent with the constant learning gain which is
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estimated jointly with the other parameters of the model.
Equations (35) and (36) describe the least squares learning process with any given learn-
ing gain, gt. When the learning gain is constant, repeated substitution of these equations
can show that the coeﬃcient matrix is given by,
Φt =
(
t−1∑
τ=0
(1− g)tXt−τX ′t−τ
)−1 (t−1∑
τ=0
(1− g)tXt−τY ′t−τ
)
(41)
In the model speciﬁcation without capital, Y ′t = [y˜t−1 pit−1 rt−1], and X
′
t = [1 y˜t−2 pit−2 rt−2].
This data agents use in their estimation procedure is observable to the econometrician and
in fact is exactly the same data that is used in this paper. To generate an initial condition
for Φ0 for case 4, I evaluate equation (41) using pre-sample data on the output gap, the
inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate from 1954:Q1 through 1959:Q4.
In the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, Y ′t = [cˆt−1 kˆt−1 pit−1 rt−1], and
X ′t = [1 cˆt−2 kˆt−2 pit−2 rˆt−2]. In this speciﬁcation of the model, some of the data agents
use are not directly observed by the econometrician. Consumption and the interest rate are
expressed as percentage deviations from the steady state, and capital stock is not directly
observable. For a given estimate of the consumption to output ratio and the steady state
level of output, pre-sample data on aggregate consumption can be expressed in terms of the
percentage deviation from the steady state. The steady state level of the interest rate is
equal to (1/β − 1), so for a given value of β, the federal funds rate can be expressed in terms
of the percentage deviation from the steady state. The inﬂation rate in agents' regressions
is observable and is equal to the growth rate of the GDP deﬂater.
Data for the U.S. capital stock does not exist, but using the New Keynesian model, data
for percentage deviation of capital from its steady state level can be composed from data on
the deviation of investment from its steady state level. By suppressing the investment shock
in the New Keynesian model during the pre-sample, equation (18) implies,
kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + δIˆt. (42)
For a given initial value for kˆt in the pre-sample, and given pre-sample data on the percentage
deviation of investment from the steady state, Iˆt, a pre-sample series of kˆt can be constructed.
I suppose at the beginning of the pre-sample capital is equal to its steady state value so that
the pre-sample initial value for kˆt is equal to zero. The steady state value of investment is
equal to the investment to output ratio times the steady state level of output. Given estimates
of these parameters, gross private domestic investment is converted to percentage deviations
from the steady state level. The initial condition for Φ0 is computed with equation (41)
using this constructed pre-sample data for consumption, capital, inﬂation, and the interest
rate.
Finally, case 5 estimates the initial conditions for the elements of the learning matrices
jointly with the other parameters of the model. To keep the likelihood maximization proce-
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dure tractable, only the initial conditions for the constant terms and the non-zero elements
in G are estimated. The initial condition for R remains given by the rational expectations
solution. This still introduces many additional parameters to estimate. In the speciﬁcation
without capital, the output gap, inﬂation, and interest rate are all estimated using a constant
and one period past values of these variables. Therefore there are four coeﬃcients for each
variable, for a total of twelve additional parameters. In the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital, consumption, capital, the inﬂation rate, and the interest rate all depend on a con-
stant and one period past values of these variables. This comes to ﬁve coeﬃcients for each
variable, for a total of twenty additional parameters. As the dataset for estimating quarterly
macroeconomic models is often relatively small, identifying these initial conditions jointly
with almost twenty parameters of the New Keynesian model with reasonable standard errors
is impossible. The motivation for proceeding with this estimation is to examine how varying
the initial conditions can inﬂuence the results for the other parameters in the model.
4.3 Maximum Likelihood Procedure
I estimate the model by maximum likelihood following the Kalman ﬁlter procedure outlined
in chapter 13 of Hamilton (1994). This procedure involves rewriting the model into state
space form. The state equation is a linear equation describing the entire New Keynesian
model including the learning mechanism. The equations governing the state are the actual
law of motion for xt, given in equation (40), and the evolution of the structural shocks given
in equation (32). Equation (40) can be rewritten more compactly as,
xt = bt + Ftxt−1 +Mtvt, (43)
where vector bt and matrices Ft and Mt are given by,
bt = Ω
−1
0 Ω2
(
I + Gˆt
)
gˆ0,t,
Ft = Ω
−1
0
(
Ω1 + Ω2Gˆ
2
t
)
,
Mt = Ω
−1
0
[
Ψ+ Ω2
(
GˆtHˆt + HˆtA
)]
This equation can be combined with equation (32) into the single state equation,
x∗t = b
∗
t + F
∗
t x
∗
t−1 + 
∗
t , (44)
where x∗t = [x
′
t v
′
t]
′ and,
F ∗t =
[
Ft MtA
0 A
]
,
b∗t =
[
bt
0
]
,
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∗t =
[
Mtt
t
]
.
The variance of ∗t is given by,
V ar(∗t ) =
[
MtΣM
′
t MtΣ
ΣM ′t Σ
]
,
where Σ is a diagonal matrix with the variance of the structural shocks along the diagonal.
In the speciﬁcation of the New Keynesian model without capital, the observation equa-
tions are given by,
GDP gapt = 100y˜t
INFt = pi
∗ + 400pit
FFt = pi
∗ + 400 (rn + rˆt) ,
(45)
where GDP gapt is the output gap, INFt is the annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP
deﬂater, FFt is the federal funds rate, r
n = 1/β − 1 is the steady state real interest rate,
and pi∗ is the steady state inﬂation rate. The derivation of the New Keynesian model relies
on the assumption that there exists a steady state price level which implies the steady state
level of inﬂation is equal to zero. Since this is unlikely to be an accurate assumption, I allow
the steady state level of inﬂation to be possibly greater than zero in the maximum likelihood
procedure.
This observation equation and the state equation, (44), are used to form the log-likelihood
function which is maximized with respect to the vector of parameters,
Θ1 = [η σ κ γ ρr ψy ψpi ρn ρu σn σu σr pi
∗ g].
This set of parameters includes all but two parameters of the model: the discount factor β,
and the inverse elasticity of the labor supply, µ. The discount factor is calibrated at β = 0.99.
The parameter µ appears in the Phillips curve equation, (26), along with κ multiplying the
output gap, and so is not separately identiﬁable. I assume that labor supply is perfectly
elastic, so that µ = 0. This assumption still allows the output gap to inﬂuence inﬂation
in the Phillips curve through the goods market clearing channel, but shuts oﬀ the inﬂuence
through the labor market clearing channel.
In the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital, the observations equations are given by,
CONSt = cyy
∗ + cyy∗cˆt
INVt = (1− cy)y∗ + (1− cy)y∗Iˆt
INFt = pi
∗ + 400pit
FFt = pi
∗ + 400 (rn + rˆt) ,
(46)
where CONSt is the de-trended level of consumption, INVt is the de-trended level of invest-
ment, and y∗is the steady state levels of output, which is estimated jointly with the other
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parameters of the model. The log-likelihood function is maximized with respect to the vector
of parameters,
Θ2 = [η σ cy φ κ γ ρr ψy ψpi ρz ρξ ρµ σz σξ σµ σr pi
∗ y∗ g].
Parameters that are not estimated in include the discount factor, β, the depreciation rate,
δ, and the inverse elasticity of labor supply, µ. The discount rate is again calibrated to
β = 0.99. The depreciation rate is calibrated to δ = 0.025, which corresponds to roughly
10% annual depreciation. The inverse elasticity of labor supply is again poorly identiﬁed. It
appears again in the Phillips curve along with κ multiplying output. It also appears in the
evolution of the aggregate capital stock, (20), along with α multiplying future expectations
of output and capital. I assume again that labor supply is perfectly inelastic, so that µ = 0.
Future expectations of output and capital still inﬂuence intermediate goods ﬁrms' investment
decisions directly, but not indirectly though the labor market clearing channel.
5 Results
5.1 Model Without Capital
I ﬁrst estimate the speciﬁcation of the New Keynesian model without capital under the ﬁve
frameworks for expectations described in the previous section.
Cases 1 and 2:
Table 1 shows the maximum likelihood parameter estimates for rational expectations and for
learning where agents include structural shocks as explanatory variables and have the rational
expectations solution for the initial conditions. The estimate for the constant learning gain
in case 2 is very small (g = 0.0067) and statistically insigniﬁcant from zero. Recall that
rational expectations is the special case of this learning framework where the learning gain
is equal to zero. The learning gain not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero implies
a failure to reject the null hypothesis that agents form expectations rationally.
The other parameters have very similar estimates under case 1 and case 2. There is no
evidence that the learning framework in case 2 helps explain macroeconomic persistence.
The estimate for the degree of habit formation under rational expectations is 0.4221 and
under learning is 0.4241. These estimates are somewhat lower than that found in other
empirical studies. Milani (2005) ﬁnds under rational expectations an estimate approximately
equal to 0.911. Smets and Wouters (2005) estimate a much more complex New Keynesian
model under rational expectations for the U.S. and ﬁnds somewhat closer esimtates of the
degree of habit formation. They ﬁnd an estimate approximately equal to 0.69 when using
quarterly data from 1974 through 2002, and another estimate equal to 0.44 when using
quarterly data from 1982 through 2002. Despite relatively low estimates for the degree
of habit formation, the estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating the habit
formation is a signiﬁcant source of persistence in the model.
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Inﬂation indexation is another possible source for persistence. The estimates for inﬂa-
tion indexation are very high: approximately equal to 0.99 under both learning and rational
expectations. Milani also ﬁnds a higher degree of inﬂation indexation under rational expecta-
tions. Other signiﬁcant sources of persistence include the interest rate smoothing parameter
and the persistence in the natural interest rate shock. The cost push shock is not a sig-
niﬁcant source of either persistence or volatility under either expectations framework. The
estimate of the persistence is nearly equal to zero, and the standard deviation of the shock
is approximately equal to 0.003, or 0.3%, under learning and rational expectations. This
result is reassuring since it is added to the model to make maximum likelihood estimation
possible, despite there not being a microfoundation for the shock.
The ﬁnal rows of Table 1 report the log-likelihood and the mean squared errors (MSE)
for the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate under rational expectations
and learning. Consistent with the small and statistically insiginicant estimate of the learning
gain coeﬃcient, the there is only a tiny improvement in the log-likelihood by adding learning.
The improvement in the MSE is also negligible.
Case 3:
Table 2 shows the results for learning under case 3, where the initial condition for the learning
process is again equal to the rational expectations solution, but agents do not include the
structural shocks as explanatory variables; the data they use are the output gap, the inﬂation
rate, and the interest rate. For easy comparison, Table 2 also repeats the estimation results
under rational expectations. The estimate for the learning gain is approximately equal to
0.0042, which is again small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Since this learning framework
does not nest rational expectations, the small learning gain does not imply expectations are
rational, only that agents' coeﬃcient estimates are slow to adjust. Since the constant gain
learning procedure can be viewed as an approximation to learning with a rolling window of
data, Milani (2005), Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and others interpret the inverse of the
estimate of the learning gain as the number of observations agents use every period to form
their expectations. In this case the learning gain implies that agents use approximately 238
quarterly observations, or 59.5 years of data.
Again, many of the other parameter estimates are similar to the estimates under rational
expectations. The most notable exceptions are the inverse of the pseudo intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, σ, and the standard deviation of the natural interest rate shock.
Under learning, the estimate for σ is 0.2251, compared to 0.5152 under rational expectations.
This indicates that the learning model predicts consumption decisions are more sensative to
changes in the real interest rate. This is likely due to the fact that consumption decisions
are less likely to change in response to stochastic shocks, since in case 3 stochastic shocks are
not used to form expectations. Therefore to capture the same degree of consumption (and
therefore output) volatility, the learning model predicts a higher intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
A similar story explains the diﬀerence in the estimate for the natural interest rate shock.
The estimate under the learning model is 0.2736 compared to 0.0751 under the rational
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expectations model. Since under this learning framework structural shocks do not contem-
poraneously inﬂuence expectations, the size of the natural interest rate shock is larger to
capture the same degree of volatility as under rational expectations.
The ﬁnal rows of Table 2 show that the learning model does not signicantly explain the
data better than rational expectations. The log-likelihood is only a tiny bit larger under
learning and the MSE of the output gap, inﬂation rate, and federal funds rate are almost
identical under rational expectations and learning.
Case 4:
The results for rational expectations and case 4 are presented in Table 3. In this learning
speciﬁcation, agents again do not use stuctural shocks as explanatory variables and now the
initial conditions are equal to weighted least squares estimates from pre-sample data. The
estimate of the learning gain is equal to 0.0828, much larger than the previous estimates. This
learning gain implies that agents use only 12 observations in forming expectations, or only
three years of data. With such a large learning gain agents' coeﬃcient estimates evolve much
more quickly. The initial values for agents' coeﬃcients are farther away from the rational
expectations solution than under the previous cases, so the larger learning gain allows the
coeﬃcients to adjust more rapidly towards the rational expectations solution. The ﬁnal rows
of Table 3 indicate that imposing these initial conditions worsen the performance of the
learning model. The log-likelihood is lower under learning than under rational expectations,
and the MSE of inﬂation and the federal funds rate are higher under learning.
The most notable diﬀerences in the parameter estimates between learning and rational
expectations include the pseudo intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the standard devi-
ation of the natural interest rate shock, and the monetary policy parameters on inﬂation
and the output gap. Again the learning model predicts a higher intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and a more volatile natural rate shock to compensate structural shocks not
contemporaneously impacting expectations. The monetary policy parameters for the feed-
back on the output gap and inﬂation are lower in the learning framework. This indicates the
initial conditions generate more movement in output and pricing decisions. The monetary
authority's reaction to these variables is predicted to be smaller to match the volatility of
the federal funds rate.
Case 5:
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the parameters when the initial conditions of the
learning process are estimated jointly with all the other parameters. The estimated values of
the initial conditions are not reported as they have very large standard errors and there is no
clear interpretation of the coeﬃcients from the reduced form model agents use to compute
their forecasts. The most notable diﬀerences in the parameter estimates is not the point
estimates, but the standard deviations of the parameter estimates. The standard deviations
of the estimates for the degree of habit formation, the inverse of the pseudo intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, the degree of price indexation, and the standard deviation of the
natural interest rate shock are all very large. This indicates that the point estimates of
these parameters can completely depend on how initial conditions for the learning process
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are speciﬁed. Moreover the sizable standard deviations on these parameter estimates com-
bined with the sizable standard deviations on estimated initial conditions imply that jointly
identifying the parameters and the initial conditions is impossible.
Comparisons:
The results from these ﬁve expectations frameworks show that learning does not explain U.S.
data any better than rational expectations, at least in terms of the simple New Keynesian
model. Figure 1 shows the paths of the forecast errors for the output gap, the inﬂation
rate, and the federal funds rate under each expectations framework over the sample period
to determine if learning may better explain diﬀerent periods in post-war U.S. history. The
top row shows the rational expectations model makes the largest forecast errors during the
1970s decade for the output gap and the inﬂation rate. The largest forecast errors for the
federal funds rate are made from 1979 through 1982, the begining of Paul Volker's tenure as
Federal Reserve chairman. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) ﬁnd empirical evidence that it was
during this period the Federal Reserve policy changed to more aggressively respond to the
inﬂation rate.
The second row of graphs indicate that the learning model under case 2 makes the same
forecast errors as the rational expectations model. The number in parantheses is the corre-
lation of the forecast error under learning to the forecast error under rational expectations.
The correlations for the forecast errors in case 2 are all above 0.99 indicating the forecast
errors under this learning framework are virtually the same as rational expectations. The
same is true for learning in case 3 where agents do not use shocks as explanatory variables
in their regressions. Despite there being some minor diﬀerences in the parameter estimates
described above, the correlations indicate the forecast errors are virtually the same as the
rational expectations model. The fourth row of graphs show the forecast errors for the
output gap and the inﬂation rate under learning with pre-sample initial conditions are less
correlated with the rational expectations forecast errors, but this is because this learning
model actually performed worse than rational expectations. The largest output gap and in-
ﬂation forecast errors are again made during the 1970s, suggesting that learning is no better
than rational expectations at explaining the experience of excessively volatile and persistent
inﬂation during this period. The ﬁnal row of forecast errors show that increasing the num-
ber of free parameters to include all the initial conditions for the learning process does not
signiﬁcantly improve the ﬁt of the model. The correlations are still very close to one, and
the largest errors occur during the 1970s decade.
Figure 2 shows the series of shocks predicted by each of the expectations framework,
along with the correlations with the rational expectations counterpart given in parentheses.
The evolution of shocks is virtually identical for rational expectations and learning under
cases 2 and 3. The path of the shocks indicate that the volatile inﬂation during the 1970s is
explained by an excessively volatile cost push shock and rather large increases in the natural
real interest rate during the early 1970s and middle to late 1970s.
The paths of the shocks with pre-sample initial conditions are not as correlated with
rational expectations as the ﬁrst two learning models. This learning framework still makes
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the same qualitative prediction that the 1970s was characterized by an excessively volatile
cost push shock. The ﬁnal row of graphs indicate that even estimating the initial conditions
jointly with the other parameters does not alter the predicted paths of the shocks.
All the results of this subsection indicate that learning does not improve the performance
of the simple New Keynesian model, nor signiﬁcantly alter the model's predictions. Figure
3 sheds some light as to why that is. This ﬁgure shows the evolution of agents expectations
under rational expectations and each learning framework. In the second through the ﬁfth
rows the solid lines are the expectations predicted under learning and the dotted lines are
the expectations predicted by rational expectations. The graphs show that the expectations
under learning are very nearly equal to the rational expectations. Since the learning frame-
works do not signiﬁcantly alter expectations, learning is no better able to explain the data
than rational expectations, at least for the standard New Keynesian model.
5.2 Model with Capital
I now turn to estimating the New Keynesian model with endogenous capital accumulation
to determine how sensative the results are to the model speciﬁcation. Including capital may
increase the role learning can play in the economy, as consumption and output expectations
play seperate roles in the economy. Also, an additional explanatory variable, capital, becomes
available for agents to use for forecasting. Introducing capital may also lessen the empirical
signiﬁcance of learning as it provides an additional source of output persistence.
Cases 1 and 2:
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates for the model under rational expectations and under
learning, case 2. There are some notable diﬀerences from the estimation results of the more
simple New Keynesian model. The estimate for the degree of habit formation is equal to
0.9181 which indicates habit formation is an even more signiﬁcant source of persistence.
The degree of inﬂation indexation is very low, equal to 0.0001. Inﬂation persistence instead
is explained by the dependence of the marginal cost on the current period capital stock, as
evident from equation (15). The current period capital stock in turn depends on last period's
capital stock and investment decisions.
The estimates for the monetary policy parameters are much lower under this speciﬁcation
of the model. The estimate of the responses to inﬂation and output is 1.0014 and 0.1003,
respectively. This diﬀerence is at least partially due to using diﬀerent data in the estimation
procedure for output. In the speciﬁcation of the New Keynesian model without capital,
monetary policy responds to the output gap as measured by the deviation of the CBO
measure of potential GDP. In the speciﬁcation with capital, monetary policy responds to the
percentage deviation of ouput from its steady state. Steady state output is estimated with
y∗, and output is deﬁned as the sum of consumption and investment.
The estimate for the steady state level of inﬂation is also much lower than in the previous
speciﬁcation. The estimate is equal to 0.2209 and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
This suggests that introducing investment dynamics helps explain large increases in inﬂation
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present in the data without having to assume a high steady state level of inﬂation.
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates for rational expectations and learning under case
2 are exactly the same. The estimated constant learning gain is equal to 0.0000, which is
the special case for rational expectations, indicating that allowing for such a small deviation
from rational expectations does nothing to further explain the data.
Case 3:
Learning under case 3 takes a more substantial step away from rational expectations as
agents have a limited information set. Table 6 shows the parameter estimated under ratio-
nal expectations and case 3 learning. The learning gain is rather small, 0.0052, but it is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero indicating that agents expectations do evolve. This estimate
coincides with agents using approximately quarterly 192 observations, or 48 years of data,
which is rather close to most empirical work using quarterly aggregate data.
Parameter estimates for the standard deviation of the technology and investment shocks
are larger under this learning model than under rational expectations. Like in the model
without capital, when agents no longer use the shocks as explanatory variables, shocks do
not concurrently aﬀect expectations, so the standard deviation of these shocks have larger
estimates to generate the same volatility.
The only other diﬀerence is the estimate for the steady state level of inﬂation is higher in
case 3. The estimate is equal to 3.8982 and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Since shocks
do not concurrently inﬂuence expectations, it will be seen later that this leads to very less
volatile expectations, especially during the 1970s. Therefore, for the maximum likelihood
procedure ﬁnds a larger steady state level of inﬂation to better account for this time period.
The ﬁnal rows in Table 6 show that moving from rational expectations to case 3 learning
leads to an improvement in the likelihood, and an improved ﬁt for aggregate investment, but
a worse ﬁt for consumption. The MSE's for inﬂation and the federal funds rate are nearly
the same.
Case 4:
Table 7 shows the results for rational expectations and learning with initial conditions set
to weighted least squares estimates from pre-sample data. The estimate of the learning
gain is 0.0060, which is much smaller than the case 4 estimate under the New Keynesian
model without capital. This implies that agents coeﬃcient estimates do evolve, but much
more slowly than predicted before. This suggests that the weighted least squares estimates
obtained from pre-sample data are more appropriate for the model with capital.
Again the estimates of the standard deviations of the technology and investment shocks
are larger than under rational expectations. The estimate for the steady state level of
inﬂation is very close to zero, indicating the initial conditions help explain the run-up of
inﬂation during the 1970s without depending on a higher normal level of inﬂation. The
likelihood and MSE for consumption, investment, and inﬂation indicate that ﬁxing the initial
conditions based on pre-sample data provides a worse ﬁt to the data than the rational
expectations model.
Case 5:
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Table 8 shows the estimation results for the ﬁnal case, where the initial conditions are
estimated simultaneously with other parameters of the model. Like in the speciﬁcation
without capital, the point estimates for the coeﬃcients under rational expectations and
learning are very similar. The standard deviations for the parameters under learning are
much smaller than case 5 in model speciﬁcation without capital, indicating jointly identifying
the initial conditions is much more feasible when using a richer model with more data. The
standard deviations for estimates for the steady state level of inﬂation, the degree of habit
formation, the inverse of the pseudo intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the degree
of inﬂation indexation are still rather large, though not as large before. This re-enforces
the claim that imposing ad-hock initial conditions for the learning process can drive the
point estimates of these parameters. The smaller magnitude of the standard deviations
suggest though that joint identiﬁcation may be possible by further extending the model and
incorporating more data.
Comparisons:
Figure 4 shows all the series of forecast errors to determine if any of the learning models
with capital are any better at explaining speciﬁc periods of U.S. history. The numbers in
parentheses are the correlations of the series with the rational expectations counterpart.
Rational expectations and learning in case 1 indicate the largest forecast errors for inﬂation
are made during the 1970s. The forecast errors for consumption and investment do not
appear clustered around a speciﬁc episode. The correlations of the forecast errors for case 3
indicate nearly the same predictions as rational expectations, except for investment. Recall
the MSE for investment is smaller under case 3 than rational expectations.
The fourth row shows the forecast errors for the model with pre-sample initial conditions.
Notice that the largest forecast errors appear at the begining of the sample. Recall the MSE
for consumption, investment, and inﬂation are larger under learning with pre-sample initial
conditions than under rational expectations. The largest errors occur at the begining of the
sample, when expectations are most dependent on the initial conditions. As time progresses,
the eﬀect of the initial conditions diminish, and the graphs show the forecast errors therefore
improve. The ﬁnal row shows the forecast errors when the initial conditions are estimated.
Table 8 shows MSE's are smaller in this case, but the path of the forecast errors are still
strongly correlated with the rational expectations forecast errors.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the structural shocks under each expectations framework.
For rational expectations, the predicted path for the technology shock is negative throughout
most of the sample, hitting the biggest lows in the early to middle 1970s and again in the
early 1980s. On the other hand, the investment shock is predominantly positive until the
recessions in 1991 and 2001. The predictions under case 3 learning is very diﬀerent. The
correlation in parentheses in Figure 5 indicates that the investment shock is actually strongly
negatively correlated with the path under rational expectations. The recessions in 1991 and
2001 instead coincide with positive investment shocks. The same is true under the remaining
learning cases, which all use the same information set as case 3.
Figure 6 sheds some light as to why this happens. The ﬁgure shows the evolution of
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expectations of consumption, inﬂation, capital stock, and output under each learning frame-
work. The second through ﬁfth rows show the learning expectations (solid line) and the
rational expectations (dotted line). The third row of the ﬁgure shows the expectations un-
der case 3 for consumption and output are somewhat similar under learning and rational
expectations, but the expectation for capital stock is much diﬀerent. There is very little
volatility in the expectations and the expectations are below the rational expectations for
much of the sample. The recessions in 1991 and 2001 coincide with the low points in capital
stock expectations. Equation (20) shows that capital stock expectations play a role in in-
vestment decisions when there is a positive capital adjustment cost. At these low points in
capital stock expectations, ﬁrms are less inclined to invest in new capital stock as they ex-
pect the capital adjustment costs will be higher. The decrease in the demand for investment
that results is the explanation for these resessions for case 3, instead of a negative stochastic
investment shock.
Notice also from ﬁgure 6 that inﬂation expectations in case 3 are also very low and not
very volatile throughout the sample, since stochastic shocks do not inﬂuence expectations.
To generate the high levels of inﬂation during the 1970s, case 3 predicts a higher estimate for
the steady state inﬂation rate as noted above. The remaining expectations that are diﬀerent
from rational expectations are diﬃcult to intrepret, but it is worthwhile to note that the
New Keynesian model with capital does result is some very diﬀerent paths for expectations
for some variables, which is not true in the model without capital. As a consequence,
incorporating learning into the model is able to produce some diﬀerent explanations for
what caused various downturns in the U.S. business cycle, even though learning does not
substantially improve the ﬁt of the models to the data.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines a standard New Keynesian monetary model and an extended model
that accounts for endogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital accumulation under rational expectations
and four assumptions for constant gain learning. The four frameworks for constant gain
learning diﬀer based on the initial conditions for the learning process and the information set
available to agents to form expectations. The models are estimated by maximum likelihood
and the results indicate that learning provides minimal to no improvement in the ﬁt of the
New Keynesian models to U.S. data. When the learning procedure is initialized using least
squares esimtation results from pre-sample data, the learning model actually ﬁts the data
worse than rational expectations. When assuming that agents have a limited information
set, where data on the stochastic shocks is not available to agents, the learning model leads
to small improvements in the ﬁt to the data. This assumption also causes some expectations
to not be as volatile which leads to some diﬀerent predictions for the size of the structural
shocks hitting the economy, and in the model with endogenous capital, this leads to diﬀerent
explanations for what caused recent recessions in U.S. history. The initial conditions for the
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learning process are ﬁnally estimated jointly with the other parameters of the model. These
results show that the initial conditions and some key parameters are not jointly identiﬁable,
and it may be possible that imposing ad-hock initial values can drive the estimates of some
of the parameters.
Plots of the forecast errors, estimated structural shocks, and agents expectations are
examined to determine if the learning models out perform rational expectations for certain
periods of U.S. history. The forecast errors for all the models are largest during the 1970s
episode of volatile and persistent output and inﬂation. Furthermore, the forecast errors of the
learning models are highly correlated with the forecast errors from the ratinal expectations
model, suggesting that least squares learning in the context of the New Keynesian model
does not explain any periods of U.S. history better than rational expectations.
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Appendix A Derivation of New Keynesian model
A.1 Consumers
The ﬁrst order conditions for ct, nt, and bt are
λt = ξt (ct − ηct−1)−σ − βηEtξt+1 (ct+1 − ηct)−σ
nt(i)
µ = λt
wt(i)
pt
λt = βEtλt+1
1 + rt
1 + pit+1
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint and therefore the marginal
utility of real income. Log-linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions yields,
λˆt =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEtcˆt+1 − σ(1 + βη2)cˆt + σηcˆt−1
]
+
(
ξˆt − βηEtξˆt+1
)
(A1)
wˆt(i)− pˆt = µnˆt(i)− λˆt (A2)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1 (A3)
where a hat indicates the percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state. Equa-
tion (A2) will be referenced later to express equilibrium real wages in terms of employment.
Equations (A3) and (A1) together implicitly deﬁne the log-linear Euler equation which de-
termines consumers' demand for ﬁnal goods.
When investment is not included in the model, the percentage deviation of consumption
from its steady state is exactly equal to the percentage deviation of output from its steady
state, and therefore the demand side of the economy can be expressed in terms of the
output gap, the percentage deviation of output from its ﬂexible price outcome. Let xˆft
be the outcome for some variable xˆt under fully ﬂexible prices, and let x˜t ≡ xˆt − xˆft be
the percentage deviation of xt from the fully ﬂexible outcome. Since the derivations in this
section do not depend on the ﬂexibility of prices, equations (A1) and (A3) hold under ﬂexible
prices. Re-writing these conditions for fully ﬂexible prices produces,
λˆft =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEtcˆ
f
t+1 − σ(1 + βη2)cˆft + σηcˆft−1
]
+
(
ξˆt − βηEtξˆt+1
)
, (A4)
λˆft = Etλˆ
f
t+1 + rˆ
f
t − Etpift+1. (A5)
Notice, ξˆt does not have an f subscript since it is an exogenous shock that is not inﬂuenced
by the ﬂexibility of prices. Subtracting (A4) from (A1) and (A5) from (A3) and imposing
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goods market clearing produces,
λ˜t =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEty˜t+1 − σ(1 + βη2)y˜t + σηy˜t−1
]
(A6)
λ˜t = Etλ˜t+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1 − rnt (A7)
where rnt ≡ rˆft − Etpift+1 is what is known as the natural interest rate, the real interest rate
that would occur under fully ﬂexible prices. This variable is usually assumed to follow an
exogenous stochastic process, therefore equations (A6) and (A7) are solely in terms of the
stationary variables: output gap, inﬂation, and interest rate.
A.2 Producers
A.2.1 Final goods ﬁrms
The ﬁnal goods ﬁrm chooses its demand for intermediate good i to maximize proﬁts,
Πt = pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1 −
∫ 1
0
pt(i)yt(i)di
The ﬁrst order condition leads to the demand for intermediate good i,
yt(i) =
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θ
yt. (A8)
which is given in equation (8).
A.2.2 Input choices
Intermediate goods ﬁrms choose labor demand and rent capital to minimize real total cost,
given in equation (14), subject to the production function, given in equation (13). The ﬁrst
order conditions are,
wt(i)
pt
= (1− α)st(i) yt(i)
nt(i)
, (A9)
ρt(i) = αst(i)
yt(i)
kt(i)
, (A10)
where st(i) is the Lagrange multiplier on the production function. The Lagrange multiplier
is interpreted as the change in the objective function from a marginal ease in the constraint.
In this case the objective function is total cost and the constraint is total output, so the
Lagrange multiplier is equal to the marginal cost.
Log-linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions yields,
ρˆt(i) = sˆt(i) + yˆt(i)− kˆt(i), (A11)
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wˆt(i)− pˆt = sˆt(i) + yˆt(i)− nˆt(i), (A12)
Combining these two equations to eliminate sˆt(i) and substituting equation (A2) to eliminate
wages and prices leads to the expression for the rental rate of capital,
ρˆt(i) = (µ+ 1)nˆt(i)− kˆt(i)− λˆt. (A13)
The production function can now be used to express the rental rate of capital only in terms
of output and capital. The log-linear production function is given by,
yˆt(i) = zˆt + αkˆt(i) + (1− α)nˆt(i). (A14)
Solving equation (A14) for nˆt(i) and substituting this into (A13) yields,
ρˆt(i) =
µ+ 1
1− αyˆt(i)−
1 + αµ
1− α kˆt(i)− λˆt −
µ+ 1
1− αzˆt (A15)
Solving equation (A11) for sˆt(i) and using equation (A15) to substitute out ρˆt(i) leads to
the expression for marginal cost for ﬁrm i,
sˆt(i) =
µ+ α
1− α yˆt(i)−
α(µ+ 1)
1− α kˆt(i)− λˆt −
µ+ 1
1− αzˆt (A16)
Summing over all the ﬁrms leads to the average marginal cost in the economy,
sˆt =
µ+ α
1− α yˆt −
α(µ+ 1)
1− α kˆt − λˆt −
µ+ 1
1− αzˆt (A17)
In the speciﬁcation of the model that does not allow for endogenous capital accumulation
α = 0, therefore the marginal cost in this case is given by,
sˆt = µyˆt − λˆt − (µ+ 1)zˆt (A18)
Subtracting equation (A17) from equation (A16), leads to an expression for the marginal
cost of ﬁrm i in terms of the average marginal cost and the ﬁrms relative output and capital
stock,
sˆt(i) = sˆt +
µ+ α
1− α [yˆt(i)− yˆt]−
α(µ+ 1)
1− α k˜t(i) (A19)
where k˜t(i) = kˆt(i)− kˆt is the relative capital stock of ﬁrm i.
A.2.3 Capital goods ﬁrms
Capital goods ﬁrms maximize the utility value of proﬁts, given in equation (19), subject
to the evolution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stock, given in equation (17). Instead of explicitly
computing the proﬁt maximizing choice of investment, one can solve the evolution of capital
Empirical Signiﬁcance of Learning with Firm-Speciﬁc Capital 31
for It(i) and substitute this into the objective function. The ﬁrst order condition is,
λt
µt
[
1 + φ
(
kt+1(i)
kt(i)
− 1
)]
=
βEt
λt+1
µt+1
µt+1ρt+1(i) + (1− δ) + φ
(
kt+2(i)
kt+1(i)
− 1
)
kt+2(i)
kt+1(i)
− φ
2
(
kt+2(i)
kt+1(i)
− 1
)2 .
(A20)
Log-linearizing this yields,
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1(i)− kˆt(i)
)
= Etλˆt+1 + [1− β (1− δ)]Etρˆt+1(i)
+βφ
(
Etkˆt+2(i)− kˆt+1(i)
)
+ µˆt − β(1− δ)Etµˆt+1.
(A21)
Plugging equation (A15) into (A21) leads to the following equilibrium condition for the
evolution of capital stock for ﬁrm i:
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1(i)− kˆt(i)
)
= β(1− δ)Etλˆt+1
+
(
1− β (1− δ)
1− α
) [
(µ+ 1)Etyˆt+1(i)− (1 + αµ)kˆt+1(i)
]
+βφ
(
Etkˆt+2(i)− kˆt+1(i)
)
− (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
1− α Etzˆt+1 + µˆt − β(1− δ)Etµˆt+1.
(A22)
Integrating equation (A22) over all ﬁrms leads to the evolution of the aggregate capital stock,
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1 − kˆt
)
= β(1− δ)Etλˆt+1
+
(
1− β (1− δ)
1− α
) [
(µ+ 1)Etyˆt+1 − (1 + αµ)kˆt+1
]
+βφ
(
Etkˆt+2 − kˆt+1
)
− (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
1− α Etzˆt+1 + µˆt − β(1− δ)Etµˆt+1.
(A23)
Subtracting equation (A23) from equation (A22) leads to following expression for ﬁrm i's
capital stock in terms of the aggregate capital stock,
φ
(
k˜t+1(i)− k˜t(i)
)
= βφ
(
Etk˜t+2(i)− k˜t+1(i)
)
+
[
1− β (1− δ)
1− α
] [
(µ+ 1)Et (yˆt+1(i)− yˆt+1)− (1 + αµ)k˜t+1(i)
]
.
(A24)
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A.2.4 Optimal pricing
The inﬂation indexation rule given in equation (23) can be re-written so that future prices
intermediate goods ﬁrms will charge while not being able to re-optimize their price can be
expressed in terms of the price chosen by the ﬁrm at time t. By repeated substitution of
equation (23), the price at time t+ T of good i can be expressed as,
pt+T (i) = pt(i) exp
(
γ
T−1∑
τ=0
pit+τ
)
,
For notational convenience, let pi∗t+T ≡
∑T−1
τ=0 pit+τ . Substitute the demand equation, (8), into
the proﬁt function, (22), to express the proﬁt only in terms of the intermediate good price,
pt(i), and aggregate state variables the ﬁrm cannot control:
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt

(
pt(i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)1−θ
yt+T − S
(pt(i)eγpi∗t+T
pt+T
)−θ
yt+T
 . (A25)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to pt(i) is given by,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt
(1− θ)
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)1−θ
+ θst+T (i)
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)−θ yt+Tp∗t (i) = 0,
(A26)
where p∗t (i) is the optimal price for a ﬁrm that is able to re-optimize its price. Since the ﬁrst
order condition cannot be rewritten in terms of inﬂation instead of prices, it is necessary to
assume prices have a steady state, which implies the steady state level of inﬂation is equal
to zero. Before log-linearizing, it is convenient to rearrange equation (A26) as,
(1− θ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T λt+T
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)1−θ
yt+T =
−θEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T λt+T st+T (i)
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)−θ
yt+T ,
(A27)
then log-linearize each side of the equal sign separately. Log-linearizing the left hand side
and right hand size, respectively, yield,
(1− θ)λyEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
λˆt+T + yˆt+T + (1− θ)
(
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T
)]
, (A28)
−θλysEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
λˆt+T + yˆt+T + sˆt+T − θ
(
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T
)]
(A29)
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where λ is the steady state marginal utility of income, y is the steady state level of output,
and s is the steady state marginal cost. Steady state marginal utility and steady output
cancel out from the left and right hand sides. The steady state marginal cost is found by
evaluating the ﬁrst order condition (A26) where λt = λ and p
∗
t (i) = pt = p for all t. In the
steady state equation (A26) simpliﬁes to,(
1
1− ωβ
)
(1− θ + θs) y
p
= 0.
The steady state solution for s is given by,
s = −1− θ
θ
. (A30)
The coeﬃcient −θ s in equation (A29) therefore cancels out with 1 − θ in equation (A28).
Combining the left and right hand side then yields,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T − sˆt+T (i)
]
= 0 (A31)
Solving for pˆ∗t (i) yields,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + sˆt+T (i)
]
. (A32)
Substitute into equation (A32), the log-linearized the demand for intermediate good i at
time t+ T , which is given by,
yˆt+T (i) = −θ(pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T ) + yˆt+T (A33)
and the marginal cost given in equation (A19). This leads to an expression for the optimal
price for ﬁrm i in terms of aggregate variables and the ﬁrm's expected future capital,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
{
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + sˆt+T −
θ (µ+ α)
1− α
[
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T
]}
− (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
{
α (µ+ 1)
1− α k˜t+T (i)
}
.
(A34)
The solution of this equation for pˆ∗t (i) is given by,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + ψsˆt+T −
ψα(µ+ 1)
1− α k˜t+T (i)
]
, (A35)
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where
ψ =
[
1 +
θ(µ+ α)
1− α
]−1
.
Equation (A35) can be rewritten as the ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation:
pˆ∗t (i) = ωβEtpˆ
∗
t+1(i) + (1− ωβ)
(
pˆt + ψsˆt − ψα(µ+ 1)
1− α k˜t(i)
)
, (A36)
where Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) denotes the expectation at time t for the time t+1 optimal decision for the
ﬁrm's new price, conditional that the ﬁrm is able to re-optimize its price again in period
t+ 1. Note, this is not the same as the unconditional time t expectation of the ﬁrm's price
in period t + 1. Since with probability ω the ﬁrm will not be able to re-optimize its price
next period, the unconditional expectation for ﬁrm i's price in period t+ 1 is given by,
Etpˆt+1(i) = ω [pˆ
∗
t (i) + γpit−1] + (1− ω)Etpˆ∗t+1(i). (A37)
A.2.5 Phillips Curve Solution Without Capital
Equation (A36) expresses the solution of the optimal price for ﬁrm i in terms of aggregate
variables pˆt and sˆt and the relative capital stock of ﬁrm i, k˜t(i). When α, the exponent
on capital in the production function is equal to zero, the coeﬃcient on the relative capital
stock in the optimal price equation is equal to zero. In this special case, equations (A35)
and (A36) simplify to, respectively,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T +
1
1 + θµ
sˆt+T
]
, (A38)
pˆ∗t (i) = ωβEtpˆ
∗
t+1(i) + (1− ωβ)
(
pˆt +
1
1 + θµ
sˆt
)
. (A39)
All the variables of the right hand side of equation (A38) are aggregate variables, therefore
all ﬁrms re-optimizing their price choose the exact same price. Let pˆ∗t denote this price.
Since the ﬁrms who re-optimize their price is randomly determined, the average price of the
ﬁrms who could not re-optimize their price is equal to the average price level in the previous
period plus the inﬂation rate of the previous period scaled by the degree of indexation. The
log-linear consumer price index then simpliﬁes to,
pˆt = (1− ω)pˆ∗t + ω (pˆt−1 + γpit−1) .
Solving this for pˆ∗t yields,
pˆ∗t =
1
1− ω (pˆt − ωpˆt−1 − ωγpit−1) (A40)
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Substituting (A40) into (A39) to eliminate pˆ∗t (i) and Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) leads to the Phillips curve,
pit =
(
1
1− βγ
)[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 +
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
ω(1 + θµ)
sˆt
]
, (A41)
where pit ≡ pˆt − pˆt−1.
When there is no capital in the model it is possible to rewrite the Phillips curve in terms
of the output gap instead of the marginal cost. When prices are fully ﬂexible, ω = 0, and
the objective function for the intermediate ﬁrm, given in equation (A25) can be rewritten
as, (
pft (i)
pft
)1−θ
yft − S
(pft (i)
pft
)−θ
yft
 . (A42)
The ﬁrst order condition imlies,
sft (i) =
1− θ
θ
(
pft (i)
pft
)
. (A43)
Since prices are fully ﬂexible, pft (i) = p
f
t for all t and the marginal cost remains constant.
The expression for the marginal cost given in equation (A18) implies under ﬂexible prices
that,
µyˆft − λˆft − (µ+ 1)zˆt = 0. (A44)
Solving this for zt and substituting this into the Phillips curve, equation (A41), leads to
following expression of the Phillips curve in terms of the output gap,
pit =
(
1
1− βγ
)[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 +
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
ω(1 + θµ)
(
µy˜t − λ˜t
)]
. (A45)
A.2.6 Phillips Curve with Capital
Deriving the Phillips curve when there is ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is substantially more compli-
cated. Equation (A36) shows that each ﬁrm's optimal price will depend on its capital stock
relative to the aggregate capital stock. Since a ﬁrm's capital stock is dependent on its entire
investment history, the optimal price will depend on the ﬁrm's entire history of being able
to re-optimize its price. The convenient result from the previous section that each ﬁrm will
choose the same price does not hold when there is ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and Calvo pricing.
Equation (A34) implicitly deﬁnes the optimal choice for the price of intermediate good
i in terms of expectations of aggregate variables and the following expectation of the ﬁrm's
future relative capital stocks:
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) (A46)
To derive the Phillips curve, we must rewrite the above expression in terms of the ﬁrm's
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current capital stock, the current optimal price, and expectations of aggregate variables.
The optimal choice for k˜t+1(i) in terms of expected future output is given in equation (A24).
Substituting the log-linear demand for yt+1(i) into equation (A24) leads to,
φ
(
k˜t+1(i)− k˜t(i)
)
= βφ
(
Etk˜t+2(i)− k˜t+1(i)
)
−
[
1− β (1− δ)
1− α
] [
θ(µ+ 1)Etp˜t+1(i)− (1 + αµ)k˜t+1(i)
]
.
(A47)
where p˜t+1(i) = pˆt+1(i)− pˆt+1 is the relative price of intermediate good i in period t+1. The
rational expectations solution for (A47) must have the form,
k˜t+1(i) = mk˜t(i) + np˜t(i), (A48)
where m and n are determined by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients in the next
subsection. For a ﬁrm re-optimizing their price, this equation can be rewritten as
k˜t+1(i) = mk˜t(i) + npˆ
∗
t (i)− npˆt(i). (A49)
Substituting this into equation (A46) shows that,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T+1(i) = mEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) +
n
1− ωβ pˆ
∗
t (i)− nEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T pˆt+T .
Multiply both sides of this equation by (ωβ) then add k˜t(i) to both sides in order to make
the summation on the left hand side identical to the summation on the right hand side.
Doing this yields,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) = ωβmEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i)+
ωβn
1− ωβ pˆ
∗
t (i)−ωβnEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T pˆt+T+k˜t(i).
Solving this equation yields,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) =
1
1− ωβm
[
ωβn
1− ωβ pˆ
∗
t (i) + k˜t(i)− ωβnEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T pˆt+T
]
. (A50)
Substituting this into equation (A34) and solving for pˆ∗t (i) leads to the following solution,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
(
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + νsˆt+T
)
− αν(µ+ 1)(1− ωβ)
(1− α)(1− ωβm) k˜t(i), (A51)
where,
ν =
[
1 +
θ(µ+ α)
1− α +
αωβn(µ+ 1)
(1− α)(1− ωβm)
]
.
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Equation (A51) expresses the optimal price of intermediate good i solely in terms of aggregate
variables and the ﬁrm's current relative capital stock. Since the capital stock was chosen in
the previous period, it is independent of whether or not a ﬁrm is currently able to re-optimize
its price. Therefore the average capital stock among ﬁrms re-optimizing their price is equal
to the average capital stock in the economy. This implies that average value for k˜t(i) over
ﬁrms re-optimizing their price is equal to zero. Let pˆ∗t denote the average price among these
ﬁrms. Equation (A51) implies,
pˆ∗t = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
(
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + νsˆt+T
)
.
This can be rewritten as the ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation,
pˆ∗t = ωβEtpˆ
∗
t+1 + (1− ωβ) (pˆt + νsˆt) . (A52)
Substituting equation (A40) into (A52) to eliminate pˆ∗t and Etpˆ
∗
t+1 leads to the Phillips curve,
pit =
(
1
1− βγ
)
[γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κsˆt] , (A53)
where,
κ =
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
νω
.
A.2.7 Method of Undetermined Coeﬃcients
This subsection uses the method of undetermined coeﬃcients to compute the values of m
and n in equation (A49) which must satisfy the optimality condition for capital given in
equation (A47). Equation (A47) can be rearranged as,
k˜t+1(i) = k˜t(i) + βEtk˜t+2(i)− ζ0Etp˜t+1(i)− ζ1k˜t+1(i), (A54)
where ζ0 and ζ1 are given by,
ζ0 =
θ (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
φ (1− α)
ζ1 = β +
(1 + αµ) [1− β (1− δ)]
φ (1− α)
I begin by ﬁnding an expression for Etp˜t+1(i) in terms of k˜t(i) and p˜t(i). Using equation
(A37), the expected relative price can be rewritten as,
Etp˜t+1(i) = Etpˆt+1(i)− Etpˆt+1 = ωpˆt(i) + (1− ω)Etpˆ∗t+1(i)− Etpˆt+1 (A55)
Empirical Signiﬁcance of Learning with Firm-Speciﬁc Capital 38
In order to express p˜t+1(i) only in terms of p˜t(i) and k˜t(i), we must next ﬁnd a solution for
pˆ∗t (i). According to equation (A39), the rational expectation solution for pˆ
∗
t (i) must take the
form,
pˆ∗t (i) = f(pˆt, sˆt) + ak˜t(i), (A56)
where f(·) is a linear function of aggregate variables and a needs to be determined by the
method of undetermined coeﬃcients. Let Lt denote the set of ﬁrms re-optimizing their price
in period t. The average price of the ﬁrms who are able to re-optimize their price is given
by,
pˆ∗t =
1
1− ω
∫
i∈Lt
pˆ∗t (i)di = f(pˆt, sˆt) +
a
1− ω
∫
i∈Lt
k˜t(i)di
Since k˜t(i) was chosen in period t − 1, it is independent of whether a ﬁrm is re-optimizing
its price. Therefore the average diﬀerence between a ﬁrm's capital stock and the aggregate
capital stock among ﬁrms re-optimizing their price is equal to zero. Therefore,
pˆ∗t = f(pˆt, sˆt),
and equation (A56) can be rewritten as,
pˆ∗t (i) = pˆ
∗
t + ak˜t(i). (A57)
Advancing equation (A57) one period and taking expectations yields,
Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) = Etpˆ
∗
t+1 + ak˜t+1(i), (A58)
where Etpˆ
∗
t+1 is the expected average price over ﬁrms that can re-optimize their price next
period. This can be rewritten in terms of the expected aggregate price level. Since a fraction
ω ﬁrms will not be able to change their price next period and the remaining 1−ω ﬁrms will
have an average price pˆ∗t+1, the expected price level next period is given by,
Etpˆt+1 = ωpˆt + (1− ω)Etpˆ∗t+1. (A59)
Solving (A59) for Etpˆ
∗
t+1 and substituting this expression into (A58) leads to,
Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) =
1
1− ω (Etpˆt+1 − ωpˆt) + ak˜t+1(i). (A60)
Substituting equation (A49) for k˜t+1(i) yields,
Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) =
1
1− ω (Etpˆt+1 − ωpˆt) + amk˜t(i)− anp˜t(i). (A61)
Plugging this into equation (A55) leads to an expression for Etp˜t+1(i) in terms of p˜t(i) and
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k˜t(i),
Etp˜t+1(i) = [ω + (1− ω) an] p˜t(i) + (1− ω) amk˜t(i) (A62)
Next, using equation (A49), the expected future capital stock is given by,
Etk˜t+2(i) = m
2k˜t(i) +mnp˜t(i) + nEtp˜t+1(i) (A63)
Substituting equation (A62) into equation (A63) leads to an expression for Etk˜t+2(i) in terms
of p˜t(i) and k˜t(i),
Etk˜t+2(i) =
[
m2 + amn (1− ω)
]
k˜t(i) +
[
mn+ nω + an2(1− ω)
]
p˜t(i) (A64)
Plugging in equations (A62), (A63), and (A49) into (A54) leads to an expression for capital
of the form given in equation (A49) where m and n must satisfy, respectively,
βm2 + [βan(1− ω)− ζ1 − ζ0a(1− ω)− 1]m+ 1 = 0, (A65)
βa(1− ω)n2 + [βm+ βω − ζ1 − ζ0a(1− ω)− 1]n− ζ0ω = 0. (A66)
All that remains is to ﬁnd an expression for a, also using the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. Substituting the expression for Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) given in equation (A61) into equation
(A36) and solving for pˆ∗t (i) yields,
pˆ∗t (i) =
1
1− ωβan
(
ωβam− ψα (µ+ 1)
1− α
)
k˜t(i)
+
ωβ
(1− ω) (1− ωβan) (Etpˆt+1 − ωpˆt) + pˆt +
ψ
1− ωβansˆt,
(A67)
which implies a must satisfy the quadratic equation,
ωβna2 + (ωβm− 1) a− αψ(µ+ 1)
1− α = 0. (A68)
Equations (A65), (A66), and (A68) make up a system of quadratic equations that jointly
determine the values for m, n, and a in terms of the parameters of the model. Since this is a
system of three quadratic equations, there are potentially eight solutions, but these equations
alone do not rule out economically infeasible outcomes. Equations (A48) and (A62) can be
rewritten as the following dynamic system:[
k˜t+1(i)
Etp˜t+1(i)
]
=
[
m n
ω + (1− ω)an 1− ω
] [
k˜t(i)
p˜t(i)
]
. (A69)
The economically feasible solution for m, n, and a must be consistent with stable means
and variances of each ﬁrm's relative capital stock and relative price. The system is stable if
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and only if the eigenvalues of the matrix in equation (A69) are inside the unit circle. The
eigenvalues are given by,
e1 =
1
2
(
m+ ω + (1− ω)an+
√
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω
)
e2 =
1
2
(
m+ ω + (1− ω)an−
√
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω
)
It is evident from these equations that e1 > e2. Therefore both eigenvalues will be less than
1 in absolute value if and only if e1 < 1 and e2 > −1. The condition on the ﬁrst eigenvalue
implies, √
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω < 2−m− ω − (1− ω)an. (A70)
Since the left hand side of the inequality is always positive, the left hand side must also be
positive. Therefore, squaring both sides preserves the direction of the inequality. Doing this
yields,
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω < 4− 4 [m+ ω + (1− ω)an] + 4 [m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 (A71)
This inequality does not preserve the restriction implied in (A70) that the right hand side
be positive. Therefore (A70) also implies
2−m− ω − (1− ω)an > 0. (A72)
The inequalities (A71) and (A72) simplify to, respectively,
m < 1− an (A73)
m < 1 + (1− ω)(1− an) (A74)
The stability condition for the second eigenvalue is,√
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω < 2 +m+ ω + (1− ω)an,
which simpliﬁes to,
m > −1− 1− ω
1 + ω
an (A75)
Finally, the coeﬃcients m, n, and a can be found by the solving the system of quadratic
equations (A65), (A66), and (A68), subject to the inequalities (A73), (A74), and (A75).
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A.3 Market clearing
Goods market clearing implies total output of the ﬁnal good is equal to aggregate consump-
tion plus aggregate investment,
yt = ct + It.
Log-linearizing this yields,
yˆt = cy cˆt + δky Iˆt, (A76)
where cy is the steady state consumption to output ratio and ky is the steady state capital
to output ratio. The steady state capital to output ratio is found by combining the steady
state ﬁrst order condition for capital rental, given in equation (A10), and the steady state
ﬁrst order condition for investment, given in equation (A20). Evaluating equation (A10) at
the steady state and using the steady state marginal cost, given in equation (A30), yields,
ρ = α
θ − 1
θ
(
y
k
)
.
Evaluating equation (A20) at the steady state yields,
1 = β (ρ+ 1− δ) .
Combining these equations to eliminate ρ leads to the following capital to output ratio,
ky =
βα(θ − 1)
θ (1− β + βδ) (A77)
Evaluating the goods market clearing condition, (A76), at the steady state yields the follow-
ing consumption to output ratio,
cy = 1− δky. (A78)
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Table 1: Model Without Capital: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Case 1 Case 2
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.4221 0.1062 0.4241 0.1216
Inverse IES σ 0.5152 0.4401 0.5236 0.4865
Phillips Slope κ 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
Price Indexation γ 0.9900 0.0634 0.9901 0.0907
MP Persistence ρr 0.9207 0.0207 0.9207 0.0214
MP Output ψy 0.4946 0.1901 0.4949 0.1967
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.9994 0.0000 1.9995 0.0000
Nat. Rate Pers. ρn 0.8488 0.0684 0.8489 0.0645
Cost Push Pers. ρu 0.0000 0.0692 0.0000 0.0608
Nat. Rate Std. Dev. σn 0.0751 0.0706 0.0736 0.0741
Cost Push Std. Dev. σu 0.0029 0.0002 0.0029 0.0003
MP Std. Dev. σr 0.0030 0.0001 0.0030 0.0001
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 5.9904 1.2374 5.9905 1.2739
Learning Gain g   0.0067 0.0070
Log-likelihood -459.9390 -459.5154
MSE Output Gap 0.6087 0.6061
MSE Inﬂation 1.3313 1.3269
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.6480 1.6519
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Table 2: Model Without Capital: Learning Without Using Shocks
Case 1 Case 3
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.4221 0.1062 0.3027 0.1216
Inverse IES σ 0.5152 0.4401 0.2251 0.4865
Phillips Slope κ 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
Price Indexation γ 0.9900 0.0634 0.9999 0.0907
MP Persistence ρr 0.9207 0.0207 0.9131 0.0214
MP Output ψy 0.4946 0.1901 0.4762 0.1967
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.9994 0.0000 1.9865 0.0000
Nat. Rate Pers. ρn 0.8488 0.0684 0.8413 0.0645
Cost Push Pers. ρu 0.0000 0.0692 0.0002 0.0608
Nat. Rate Std. Dev. σn 0.0751 0.0706 0.2736 0.0741
Cost Push Std. Dev. σu 0.0029 0.0002 0.0054 0.0003
MP Std. Dev. σr 0.0030 0.0001 0.0030 0.0001
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 5.9904 1.2374 5.9539 1.2739
Learning Gain g   0.0042 0.0070
Log-likelihood -459.9390 -458.8326
MSE Output Gap 0.6087 0.6032
MSE Inﬂation 1.3313 1.3371
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.6480 1.6378
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Table 3: Model Without Capital: Learning with Pre-sample Initial Conditions
Case 1 Case 4
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.4221 0.1062 0.5293 0.1216
Inverse IES σ 0.5152 0.4401 0.2502 0.4865
Phillips Slope κ 0.0001 0.0002 0.0064 0.0002
Price Indexation γ 0.9900 0.0634 0.9989 0.0907
MP Persistence ρr 0.9207 0.0207 0.8454 0.0214
MP Output ψy 0.4946 0.1901 0.3200 0.1967
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.9994 0.0000 1.5109 0.0000
Nat. Rate Pers. ρn 0.8488 0.0684 0.6810 0.0645
Cost Push Pers. ρu 0.0000 0.0692 0.4419 0.0608
Nat. Rate Std. Dev. σn 0.0751 0.0706 0.5835 0.0741
Cost Push Std. Dev. σu 0.0029 0.0002 0.0086 0.0003
MP Std. Dev. σr 0.0030 0.0001 0.0030 0.0001
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 5.9904 1.2374 5.8862 1.2739
Learning Gain g   0.0828 0.0070
Log-likelihood -459.9390 -573.3274
MSE Output Gap 0.6087 0.7989
MSE Inﬂation 1.3313 2.7104
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.6480 1.7396
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Table 4: Model Without Capital: Learning with Estimated Initial Conditions
Case 1 Case 5
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.4221 0.1062 0.3052 0.1216
Inverse IES σ 0.5152 0.4401 0.1960 0.4865
Phillips Slope κ 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
Price Indexation γ 0.9900 0.0634 0.9893 0.0907
MP Persistence ρr 0.9207 0.0207 0.9193 0.0214
MP Output ψy 0.4946 0.1901 0.4944 0.1967
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.9994 0.0000 1.9992 0.0000
Nat. Rate Pers. ρn 0.8488 0.0684 0.8488 0.0645
Cost Push Pers. ρu 0.0000 0.0692 0.0000 0.0608
Nat. Rate Std. Dev. σn 0.0751 0.0706 0.2310 0.0741
Cost Push Std. Dev. σu 0.0029 0.0002 0.0054 0.0003
MP Std. Dev. σr 0.0030 0.0001 0.0030 0.0001
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 5.9904 1.2374 5.9894 1.2739
Learning Gain g   0.0000 0.0070
Log-likelihood -459.9390 -449.3276
MSE Output Gap 0.6087 0.5679
MSE Inﬂation 1.3313 1.2922
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.6480 1.6486
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Figure 1: Forecast Errors
Rational Expectations
Output gap Inﬂation Federal Funds Rate
Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Output gap (0.9993) Inﬂation (0.9973) Federal Funds Rate (0.9999)
Learning Without Observable Shocks
Output gap (0.9846) Inﬂation (0.9960) Federal Funds Rate (0.9996)
Learning with Pre-sample Initial Conditions
Output gap (0.7344) Inﬂation (0.7617) Federal Funds Rate (0.9481)
Learning with Estimated Initial Conditions
Output gap (0.9682) Inﬂation (0.9896) Federal Funds Rate (0.9997)
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Figure 2: Estimated Shocks
Rational Expectations
Nat. Rate Cost Push Policy Shock
Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Nat. Rate (0.9996) Cost Push (0.9965) Policy Shock (1.0000)
Learning Without Observable Shocks
Nat. Rate (0.9731) Cost Push (0.9932) Policy Shock (0.9995)
Learning with Pre-sample Initial Conditions
Nat. Rate (0.3652) Cost Push (0.6110) Policy Shock (0.9619)
Learning with Estimated Initial Conditions
Nat. Rate (0.9769) Cost Push (0.9832) Policy Shock (0.9998)
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Figure 3: Expectations
Rational Expectations
Output Gap Inﬂation
Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Output Gap Inﬂation
Learning Without Using Shocks
Output Gap Inﬂation
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Output Gap Inﬂation
Learning with Estimated Initial Conditions
Output Gap Inﬂation
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Table 5: Model With Capital: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Case 1 Case 2
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.9181 0.1007 0.9181 0.1017
Inverse IES σ 0.3432 0.7774 0.3432 0.7967
Capital Share α 0.3584 0.1189 0.3584 0.1219
Cons / Output cy 0.8753 0.0044 0.8753 0.0044
Cost Capital Adj. φ 6.9883 1.4836 6.9883 2.8850
Phillips Slope κ 0.0090 0.0036 0.0090 0.0039
Price Indexation γ 0.0001 0.0768 0.0001 0.0769
MP Persistence ρr 0.7481 0.0472 0.7481 0.0570
MP Output ψy 0.1003 0.0379 0.1003 0.0379
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.0014 0.1195 1.0014 0.1219
Tech. Shock Pers. ρz 0.9716 0.0133 0.9716 0.0134
Pref. Shock Pers. ρξ 0.5647 0.1159 0.5647 0.1160
Inv. Shock Pers. ρµ 0.9050 0.0426 0.9050 0.0435
Tech. Shock Std. Dev. σz 0.0094 0.0041 0.0094 0.0044
Inv. Shock Std. Dev. σµ 0.0306 0.0070 0.0306 0.0099
Pref. Shock Std. Dev. σξ 0.3587 0.2699 0.3587 0.2741
MP Shock Std. Dev. σr 0.0033 0.0002 0.0033 0.0003
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 0.2209 4.2127 0.2209 4.2253
SS Output (10,000) y∗ 1.4085 0.0212 1.4085 0.0213
Learning gain g   0.0000 0.0147
Log-likelihood -2391.5472 -2391.5472
MSE Consumption 7285.1049 7285.1049
MSE Investment 14454.2922 14454.2922
MSE Inﬂation 1.2633 1.2633
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.7499 1.7499
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Table 6: Model With Capital: Learning Without Using Shocks
Case 1 Case 3
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.9181 0.1007 0.8393 0.1888
Inverse IES σ 0.3432 0.7774 0.3771 0.8493
Capital Share α 0.3584 0.1189 0.3870 0.2697
Cons / Output cy 0.8753 0.0044 0.8987 0.0000
Cost Capital Adj. φ 6.9883 1.4836 6.9747 2.1739
Phillips Slope κ 0.0090 0.0036 0.0158 0.0065
Price Indexation γ 0.0001 0.0768 0.0007 0.0774
MP Persistence ρr 0.7481 0.0472 0.8031 0.0365
MP Output ψy 0.1003 0.0379 0.1005 0.0478
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.0014 0.1195 1.0285 0.1656
Tech. Shock Pers. ρz 0.9716 0.0133 0.9689 0.0461
Pref. Shock Pers. ρξ 0.5647 0.1159 0.6644 0.1550
Inv. Shock Pers. ρµ 0.9050 0.0426 0.9182 0.0050
Tech. Shock Std. Dev. σz 0.0094 0.0041 0.1133 0.0708
Inv. Shock Std. Dev. σµ 0.0306 0.0070 0.1026 0.0189
Pref. Shock Std. Dev. σξ 0.3587 0.2699 0.3532 0.1867
MP Shock Std. Dev. σr 0.0033 0.0002 0.0031 0.0001
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 0.2209 4.2127 3.8982 1.4266
SS Output (10,000) y∗ 1.4085 0.0212 1.4200 0.0181
Learning gain g   0.0052 0.0019
Log-likelihood -2391.5472 -2320.0228
MSE Consumption 7285.1049 9532.5647
MSE Investment 14454.2922 11044.5295
MSE Inﬂation 1.2633 1.2455
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.7499 1.6766
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Table 7: Model With Capital: Learning with Pre-sample Initial Conditions
Case 1 Case 4
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.9181 0.1007 0.7685 0.2555
Inverse IES σ 0.3432 0.7774 0.6433 1.7938
Capital Share α 0.3584 0.1189 0.3177 0.3785
Cons / Output cy 0.8753 0.0044 0.8944 0.0036
Cost Capital Adj. φ 6.9883 1.4836 6.8234 2.6605
Phillips Slope κ 0.0090 0.0036 0.0113 0.0035
Price Indexation γ 0.0001 0.0768 0.0877 0.1071
MP Persistence ρr 0.7481 0.0472 0.8975 0.0382
MP Output ψy 0.1003 0.0379 0.1565 0.1132
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.0014 0.1195 1.0462 0.1866
Tech. Shock Pers. ρz 0.9716 0.0133 0.8205 0.0357
Pref. Shock Pers. ρξ 0.5647 0.1159 0.9007 0.0286
Inv. Shock Pers. ρµ 0.9050 0.0426 1.0000 0.0000
Tech. Shock Std. Dev. σz 0.0094 0.0041 0.3079 0.1910
Inv. Shock Std. Dev. σµ 0.0306 0.0070 0.1064 0.0133
Pref. Shock Std. Dev. σξ 0.3587 0.2699 0.4362 0.4727
MP Shock Std. Dev. σr 0.0033 0.0002 0.0032 0.0001
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 0.2209 4.2127 0.0035 0.9250
SS Output (10,000) y∗ 1.4085 0.0212 1.4074 0.0089
Learning gain g   0.0060 0.0012
Log-likelihood -2391.5472 -2506.8255
MSE Consumption 7285.1049 9584.1202
MSE Investment 14454.2922 44510.7805
MSE Inﬂation 1.2633 3.5212
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.7499 1.5378
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Table 8: Model With Capital: Learning with Estimated Initial Conditions
Case 1 Case 5
Description Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. Estimate Std. Dev.
Habit Formation η 0.9181 0.1007 0.8564 6.7771
Inverse IES σ 0.3432 0.7774 0.1667 16.3052
Capital Share α 0.3584 0.1189 0.3662 0.6600
Cons / Output cy 0.8753 0.0044 0.8851 0.0122
Cost Capital Adj. φ 6.9883 1.4836 6.9999 0.0001
Phillips Slope κ 0.0090 0.0036 0.0287 0.0201
Price Indexation γ 0.0001 0.0768 0.0002 0.3186
MP Persistence ρr 0.7481 0.0472 0.9136 0.0641
MP Output ψy 0.1003 0.0379 0.1296 0.2032
MP Inﬂation ψpi 1.0014 0.1195 1.0089 0.4514
Tech. Shock Pers. ρz 0.9716 0.0133 0.9582 0.0411
Pref. Shock Pers. ρξ 0.5647 0.1159 0.1614 0.1110
Inv. Shock Pers. ρµ 0.9050 0.0426 0.9075 0.0902
Tech. Shock Std. Dev. σz 0.0094 0.0041 0.0609 0.0920
Inv. Shock Std. Dev. σµ 0.0306 0.0070 0.0709 0.0220
Pref. Shock Std. Dev. σξ 0.3587 0.2699 0.0918 0.2118
MP Shock Std. Dev. σr 0.0033 0.0002 0.0030 0.0001
SS Inﬂation pi∗ 0.2209 4.2127 0.2202 4.7265
SS Output (10,000) y∗ 1.4085 0.0212 1.4177 0.0783
Learning gain g   0.0005 0.0018
Log-likelihood -2391.5472 -2237.0404
MSE Consumption 7285.1049 6702.3679
MSE Investment 14454.2922 6304.4836
MSE Inﬂation 1.2633 1.1815
MSE Fed. Funds Rate 1.7499 1.4896
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Figure 4: Forecast Errors
Rational Expectations
Consumption Inﬂation Fed. Funds Investment
Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Consumption (1.0000) Inﬂation (1.0000) Fed. Funds (1.0000) Investment (1.0000)
Learning Without Observable Shocks
Consumption (0.9150) Inﬂation (0.9635) Fed. Funds (0.9719) Investment (0.7828)
Learning with Pre-sample Initial Conditions
Consumption (0.8813) Inﬂation (0.6142) Fed. Funds (0.9301) Investment (0.5128)
Learning with Estimated Initial Conditions
Consumption (0.8977) Inﬂation (0.9843) Fed. Funds (0.9245) Investment (0.6910)
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Figure 5: Estimated Shocks
Rational Expectations
Preference Technology Investment Policy Shock
Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Preference (1.0000) Technology (1.0000) Investment (1.0000) Policy Shock (1.0000)
Learning Without Observable Shocks
Preference (0.8697) Technology (0.6534) Investment (-0.8120) Policy Shock (0.9867)
Learning with Pre-sample Initial Conditions
Preference (0.7522) Technology (0.5440) Investment (-0.6584) Policy Shock (0.8697)
Learning with Estimated Initial Conditions
Preference (0.8200) Technology (0.8365) Investment (-0.7371) Policy Shock (0.8917)
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Figure 6: Expectations
Rational Expectations
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